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ABSTRACT
Do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) “holdup” companies that produce standard-compliant products?
To explore this question, we use detailed information from the dockets of all U.S. patent cases filed 2010-2019
that assert or challenge SEPs to construct measures of opportunistic conduct by SEP licensors, including actions
that took place before the lawsuit was filed. We find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the SEP enforcer
in at least 75% of SEP assertions in court, and we analyze various factors that determine which opportunistic
behaviors SEP enforcers rely on. We also show that opportunistic behavior can affect case outcomes, although
the effect on settlement is ambiguous. Some behaviors increase the likelihood of a settlement, while others
decrease it.
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1 Introduction
How should patent owners be compensated when they obtain patent rights that cover
some aspect of a widely used technology standard? Perhaps no issue has drawn more
attention from the international patent community in the last decade. However, despite
years of scholarly debate, multi-national litigation, and scrutiny from competition reg-
ulators, no consensus answer has emerged. On one side of the divide, scholars, courts,
and policymakers have urged the adoption of special rules and procedures for licensing
standard-essential patents (SEPs), given the (at least theoretical) ability of SEP owners
to leverage their patent rights (post-standardization) to extract royalties that exceed
the (pre-standardization) value of their inventions by “holding up” companies that sell
standard-compliant products and services.1 On the other side, additional commenta-
tors, judges, and regulators have urged, often citing an incentive for licensees to “hold
out” and delay licensing SEPs absent rules with substantial coercive effect, a more lais-
sez faire approach consistent with traditional patent enforcement.2
A key reason for this divide in the literature is that, while theory predicts the ex-
istence of holdup (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007), verifying its existence
empirically has proven challenging. At present, “actual evidence of holdup remains
scant” (Delrahim, 2019)3 and mixed at best (Contreras, 2019), with some suggesting
that holdup does not exist at all or has no significant impact on innovation (Galetovic
et al., 2015; Barnett, 2017).
In turn, a fundamental reason for this lack of empirical evidence is a paucity of
readily available, public information on the behavior of SEP licensors.4 The market for
licensing SEPs—like the market for transferring patent rights more generally—largely
operates in the dark. As private contracts, virtually all deals are negotiated in secret
and thereafter rarely come to light. Consequently, data on SEP licensing positions and
tactics, proposed and agreed upon terms, and royalty structures and amounts are dis-
persed among myriad companies that are generally obligated to keep what they know
confidential.
In this paper, we explore a heretofore underutilized source of information about SEP
licensing behavior: U.S. court dockets. While SEP licensing often takes place outside
of court, a significant fraction of disputes between SEP licensors and licensees lead to
litigation, and these court cases in turn produce a trove of public information about
1See for example Lemley (2007); DOJ/FTC (2007); FTC (2011); Scott Morton and Shapiro (2016).
2See for example Epstein and Noroozi (2017) and USPTO/NIST/DOJ 2019 joint policy statement on
remedies for standards-essential patents. Teece (2018) additionally considers incentives to participate
in the standard development process itself.
3Speech by Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim at the Licensing Executives Society 2019
Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, October 21, 2019.
4There are, of course, other explanations. For one, potential licensees may anticipate holdup and
structure their activities so as to avoid or minimize it (e.g., by abandoning plans to produce standard-
compliant products or engage in cross-licensing). In addition, holdup is inherently hard to measure.
While potential SEP licensees commonly allege that SEP licensors charge unreasonably high royalty
rates, it is no easy task to assess whether a royalty rate is indeed unreasonable and, if so, to what degree
holdup is responsible.
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the positions and behaviors of the litigants.5 We review the dockets of the population
of patent cases filed in U.S. district courts between 2010 and 2019 to assert or chal-
lenge one or more patents declared essential to a large number of technology standards
administered by a total of 16 standard setting organizations (SSOs) and patent pools.
While others have analyzed SEP litigation in the U.S., the existing literature has
largely focused on a small number of highly selected cases that were litigated to appel-
late decisions.6 In a recent noteworthy exception, Lemley and Simcoe (2019) analyze
537 U.S. district court cases that involve 355 SEPs declared to 13 SSOs. They compare
these suits with a matched sample of cases involving non-SEPs, and find that declared
SEPs are significantly less likely to be found infringed (and, thus, commonly appear
not to actually be “essential” to the standard). In another exception, Contreras (2017)
studies 118 U.S. district court cases filed by NPEs between 2000 and 2015 to enforce
SEPs declared to seven SSOs.
Our work expands upon existing studies of SEP litigation to examine dockets in
much greater detail and for a much larger set of SEPs litigated over the entire last
decade. Beyond case-level outcomes, we (i) collect and analyze data on holdup re-
lated allegations made in court pleadings and motions, (ii) incorporate richer data on
accused products and litigants, (iii) identify and incorporate data from parallel U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) proceedings, and (iv) expand all data to the
patent-party-level.7 Using this detailed data, we are able to quantify the extent to which
SEP licensors rely on a variety of opportunistic conduct to place pressure on prospec-
tive SEP licensees. Our data also allow us to identify the circumstances under which
SEP owners engage in opportunistic conduct and to analyze whether what we observe
is consistent with theories of patent holdup. This analysis also allows us to validate
our measures of opportunistic conduct, which are in part constructed using data drawn
from (potentially unreliable) allegations made in court pleadings.8
The measures that we construct take a broad view of potential holdup behavior by
SEP owners. They include not only injunction requests and parallel ITC investigations,
but also strategic choices concerning SEP declarations and the specific methods used
to compute royalty rates. To be clear, we do not claim that the presence of any of
5With the notable exception of evidence on royalty rates paid by third parties to license SEPs. Details
concerning specific licensing negotiations and terms are virtually always redacted or filed “under seal.”
6Most commonly, Microsoft, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, and TCL Communication
Technology v. Ericsson, Inc., which have been oft cited as evidence of holdup, and Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link
Systems Inc., which is frequently cited as evidence of the opposite (Contreras, 2019).
7While studies of litigation typically collect a single set of data for each case (i.e., collect data at the
case level), patent enforcers commonly assert multiple patents against multiple accused infringers in
the same case. To account for within-case variation across patents and defendants, we collect data for
each unique patent-defendant pair (i.e., we collect data at the patent-party level). For example, if an
SEP enforcer sued two companies for allegedly infringing two patents each, we collect data for all four
unique SEP-company infringement allegations.
8That said, we caution that our analysis cannot reveal what the “right” royalty rate is for any given
case, and thus we do not claim to show that the royalties demanded by SEP licensors are too high due to
the evidence of opportunistic behavior that we observe. Nonetheless, a fundamental distinction between
licensing SEPs and other patents is that there are generally no adequate substitutes to standardized tech-
nology. The potential licensee must pay, risk a lawsuit, or abandon the product altogether. Accordingly,
opportunistic behaviors are likely to be more effective in the SEP licensing context.
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these behaviors constitutes, in itself, empirical proof of holdup. Instead, we simply
quantify the extent to which these different behaviors occur (or are alleged to occur)
when SEPs are asserted in court. To better interpret these measures in the context
of patent holdup theory, we explore different factors that correlate with the different
opportunistic behaviors displayed by SEP owners.
Overall, we observe that allegations of opportunistic conduct are very common in
SEP litigation. There is at least some specific evidence of opportunistic behavior in 83%
of SEP assertions by practicing entities (PEs) and 73% of assertions by non-practicing
entities (NPEs). In fact, we find that NPEs engage (or are alleged to engage) less often
in opportunistic conduct not only in terms of injunctions but across all measures that we
explore, with the sole exception of asserting patents that were declared in an “untimely”
fashion (i.e., not until after the standard was adopted). Among SEP assertions by PEs,
we find that requests for injunctions are commonly included in the pleadings, as are
responsive allegations of overdeclaration and patent exhaustion.
In light of ample evidence of opportunistic licensing behavior by SEP enforcers, we
ask whether these behaviors affect case outcomes. Our outcome data (collected at the
patent-party level) reveals that, conditional on not settling a case, accused infringers are
surprisingly successful at defending SEP enforcement cases. Overall, accused infringers
prevail in about 66% of decided PE cases and 80% of decided NPE cases. However,
the reflections of opportunistic conduct that we observe in the record do not appear
to have a consistent effect on case decision. While we find that several opportunistic
licensing behaviors have a significant impact on settlement, we also find that those
effects point in both directions. Some opportunistic behaviors, such as pursuing an
importation ban at the ITC or an injunction in foreign litigation, increased the likelihood
of settlement. In contrast, other behaviors with a more direct link to royalty demands,
such as using the entire market value of the accused product (rather than the price of
the smallest salable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU)) as the royalty base, decreased the
likelihood of settlement. We show that these opposing effects can be explained by a
simple model of patent litigation. Specifically, our model predicts that opportunistic
behaviors that mainly aim to increase the accused infringer’s litigation costs tend to
increase the settlement rate, while opportunistic behaviors that primarily increase the
accused infringer’s losses if the SEP holder wins in court tend to decrease the settlement
rate. A potential implication of this finding (which we do not study in this paper) is
that the welfare effects of opportunistic behaviors may depend on the specific type of
behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Part 2, we briefly summa-
rize the current debate related to the licensing of SEPs, and in Part 3 we describe our
measures of opportunistic conduct in the SEP context. In Part 4, we describe our data
collection methodology, and in Part 5 we present our empirical and theoretical results.
Section 6 offers a few concluding remarks.
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2 Technology Standards and Patents
Broadly speaking, a technology standard defines a common set of rules or guidelines—
typically selected by a group of companies working together, voluntarily, under the
auspices of a standard-setting organization (SSO)—to foster interoperability among
products in a particular domain. In the context of networking, for example, commu-
nications standards such as WiFi, Bluetooth, and LTE have in recent years been widely
adopted across the globe to connect computers, smartphones, and a growing list of
other devices to both one another and an ever-changing variety of related peripherals,
equipment, and services.
2.1 FRAND Licensing
While interoperability has many beneficial (and pro-competitive) effects, competition
concerns nonetheless arise when standards are protected by intellectual property rights.
When competitors come together to collaborate, there may be a temptation to engage
in exclusionary conduct, and patent rights to standardized technology may provide a
convenient mechanism to exclude future market entrants and competitors that did not
participate in the standard-setting process.
To assuage these concerns (and put competition authorities at ease), many SSOs
require their members to both (i) publicly declare what patent rights (if any) they own
that cover some aspect of the standard and (ii) commit to license those patents on “fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms. If the declaration requirement
is observed, SSO participants can assemble standards that take licensing costs into ac-
count and can better assess the extent to which a company’s support for a particular
proposal is rooted in its technological superiority, rather than its ability to generate
patent royalties. Likewise, if FRAND licensing commitments are honored, standards
can be widely adopted, with no segment of the market excluded by virtue of a flat re-
fusal to license or an offer to license only on terms that no reasonable competitor would
accept.
However, FRAND commitments are no panacea. While outright exclusionary con-
duct is rarely observed,9 more subtle problems persist. One source of concern is that
SEP licensing takes place only after the standard is adopted and generally only after
it has been widely deployed. This sequence of events raises the possibility of holdup
because potential licensees are effectively “locked in” to using the standard—i.e., no
reasonable alternatives exist. Accordingly, SEP licensors can (in theory at least) lever-
age the value of standardization itself to extract royalties from licensees that exceed
the incremental pre-standardization value of the patented invention.
Another related concern flows from the fact that patents essential to a given stan-
dard are typically owned by many firms. As a result, potential licensees must generally
negotiate and execute multiple licenses to acquire rights to use the standard free and
clear. In addition to the transaction costs involved, executing multiple licenses in an
9Even when it is observed, courts may not recognize it as unlawful conduct, as illustrated by a recent
decision in FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020).
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environment where holdup is possible can lead to “royalty stacking”—i.e., an accumu-
lation of inflated royalties demanded by multiple firms (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007).
Indeed, it has been alleged that some SEP holders further exacerbate this problem by
intentionally divesting assets to multiple “privateer” firms that can, collectively, extract
a larger aggregate royalty than one firm licensing one unified portfolio of SEPs (Rubin-
feld, 2018).
On the other hand, FRAND commitments limit an SEP licensor’s ability to enforce
their patent rights, which can provide incentives for potential licensees to hold out—
i.e., to unreasonably delay or refuse licensing SEPs (Heiden and Petit, 2017). Since the
SEP licensor has already incurred sunk investment in the technology standard, in this
context it is the SEP licensor that is exposed to holdup by the potential licensee (indeed,
holdout is also sometimes referred to as “reverse holdup”). While potential licensees’
ability to holdout is itself an important and related topic, in this study we observe only
the actions of SEP licensors and, thus, by necessity focus on behaviors associated with
holdup.
2.2 SEP Holdup vs. Economic Holdup
In contrast to how the term is commonly used in the context of SEP licensing, the
economic literature has traditionally taken a narrow view of what constitutes holdup.
The standard economic definition refers to a situation where: (i) two parties come to
an incomplete agreement about a future transaction, (ii) one party makes irreversible
relationship-specific investments in anticipation of the transaction’s consummation, and
(iii) the other party unexpectedly attempts to extract quasi-rents from the transaction
by opportunistically exploiting the first party’s earlier investment (Williamson, 1975,
1976). SEP licensing activities arguably fail to meet this definition due to the absence
of an ex ante agreement between the parties combined with the absence of an ex post
surprise (except for rare instances of “patent ambush”);10 at best, the potential licensee
is a third-party beneficiary of the original SEP owner’s FRAND commitment to the SSO.
However, in the law and economics literature, holdup has been used more expan-
sively to encompass a variety of behaviors by which patentees may be able to extract
“unreasonably high royalties” by leveraging the fact that the accused infringer or poten-
tial licensee has made investments that cannot (easily) be “redeployed to non-infringing
products” (Shapiro and Lemley, 2020). While broader, this definition nonetheless
tracks the general economic definition of holdup, in that once a party has made re-
lationship specific investments, the other party can extract a higher price than it could
have before (regardless of the existence of a specific ex ante agreement). However, this
does not imply that “[t]he proof that patent holdup has occurred is simply that a patent
holder demands royalties from an unhappy licensee who made a relation-specific in-
vestment” (Galetovic and Haber, 2017, p. 24). Properly defined, holdup in the SEP
context still requires that SEP enforcers engage in opportunistic conduct after potential
licensees have made specific, sunk investments (Cotter et al., 2019).
In the specific context of SEP licensing, the main argument in the literature for
10See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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the existence of holdup is that SEP owners have more post-standardization bargaining
power (relative to similarly situated non-SEP owners) because there are usually no
adequate substitutes for the standard. As a result, the SEP owner can charge royalties
in excess of the economic value of the patented technology, which can have two negative
effects. First, some accused infringers and prospective licensees will accept excessive
royalty rates and either pass on the increased cost to consumers or see profit margins
reduced. And second, companies that anticipate holdup will proactively avoid it—e.g.,
by abandoning or avoiding standard-compliant product markets—which implies less
technology adoption, lower output, and ultimately less innovation. The literature has
additionally identified a number of different behaviors that can result in holdup, a fact
that we explore in greater detail in the section below. Lemley and Shapiro (2007), for
example, focus on the threat of a preliminary injunction as a way for the SEP owner to
exert pressure on companies accused of patent infringement.
However, despite the clear theoretical appeal of holdup, empirically demonstrat-
ing its existence has proven challenging. One source of difficulty is the fact (already
mentioned above) that, if companies understand the risk of holdup, they will avoid
or mitigate it. In addition, directly measuring holdup (to the extent that it cannot be
avoided) requires a comparison between the (typically confidential) royalty rate de-
manded by the SEP owner and the (often practically incalculable) royalty rate that
would prevail in the absence of holdup. Moreover, while there have been instances in
which individual SEP owners clearly attempted holdup—most notably cases involving
“patent ambush”11 or in which SEP owners preemptively sought injunctive relief be-
fore trying to negotiate a license12—such cases are relatively rare and, alone, are not
convincing proof of systematic holdup.
In fact, to the contrary, Galetovic et al. (2015) test indirectly for holdup’s effect on
innovation and conclude that the evidence is lacking. Looking at changes in quality-
adjusted prices over time and across industries that do and do not rely heavily on stan-
dards, they find no evidence that prices for standard-compliant products fall at slower
rates that prices for other products. Accordingly, they conclude that to the extent that
holdup exists, it has no discernible impact on innovation.
3 Measuring Holdup
Our empirical approach also focuses on collecting and quantifying indirect evidence
of holdup, but our approach otherwise differs greatly from Galetovic et al. (2015).
Rather than studying aggregated product market data, we hew much closer to the SEP
licensing ecosystem by examining the actions of specific SEP licensors and licensees in
specific licensing disputes that resulted in litigation.
We begin by defining a set of eleven indicators of opportunistic behavior that SEP
11See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
12See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he
court holds that defendants breached their contractual obligations to IEEE and to Realtek as a third-
party beneficiary of that contract by seeking injunctive relief against Realtek before offering Realtek a
license.”).
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licensors may take in an attempt to exert holdup power, broadly defined. In the existing
literature and case law, a wide variety of conduct has been associated with potential
holdup—i.e., have been identified as strategies that an SEP licensor could employ to
obtain excessive royalties, possibly in violation of competition law or its FRAND obliga-
tions. Combining this existing evidence with information gleaned from court records
(as detailed below), we construct a variety of measures of opportunistic conduct by SEP
licensors, which we summarize in Table 1. While these behaviors have all been associ-
ated with holdup, we stress at the outset that many are not per se unlawful and none
are, standing alone, conclusive proof of holdup. Nonetheless, measuring the frequency
with which these behaviors occur (actually or allegedly) in litigation can shed light on
the prevalence with which holdup occurs.
Our measures of opportunism begin with strategic behaviors concerning patent dec-
larations and filings. As noted above, an SEP holder has an incentive before a standard
is finalized to declare as few patents as it plausibly can. All else equal, a technology is
more likely to be incorporated into the standard if it is covered by fewer patents. More-
over, a company’s advocacy for the adoption of a particular technology is, all else equal,
more likely to be persuasive if the company holds few (or no) patent rights covering
that technology. However, once a standard is finalized, incentives change. Now, an SEP
holder has an incentive to aggressively pursue and declare as essential as many patents
as possible in hopes of inflating its share of the future stream of royalties.13 In the anal-
ysis below, we refer to these two opportunistic behaviors as untimely declaration and
overdeclaration, respectively.
Post-standardization, SEPs licensors can engage in many other opportunistic behav-
iors in an attempt to increase royalty revenue. First, SEP licensors can push or exceed
the boundaries of their FRAND commitments. While FRAND is designed to ensure
that licenses are widely available on a “non-discriminatory” basis, SEP licensors natu-
rally face strong incentives to engage in discriminatory or exclusionary licensing and,
moreover, can generally do so while maintaining a facially neutral licensing policy. For
example, a consistent royalty rate applied to each standard-compliant product can lead
to royalties that vary greatly among companies and that capture value attributable to
features and components completely unrelated to the standard. Even with a flat dollar-
value-per-unit royalty, it is possible for an SEP holder to select a rate that it knows some
competitors cannot afford to pay. Below, we refer to both practices as discriminatory
licensing.
Moreover, despite committing to license SEPs on FRAND terms, SEP holders may
nonetheless pursue (or threaten to pursue) injunctive relief, just as they would if as-
serting non-essential patents. A sizeable theoretical literature explores the effect of
injunctions on incentives to settle patent cases and license patent rights (e.g. Shapiro,
2010), and in their 2013 joint policy statement the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
and USPTO stated expressly that in the FRAND context an “injunction or exclusion or-
13In a “top-down” approach to calculating royalties, the share of SEPs of a given standard held by a
company affects directly the amount of royalties received. Moreover, Righi and Simcoe (2020) find that a
majority of SEPs issue from continuation applications filed after standard publication and, “[c]onsistent
with opportunistic behavior by patentees,” additionally observe a large increase in SEP continuations
immediately after standards are finalized.
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der may be inconsistent with the public interest.” We capture SEP enforcers’ assertion
of entitlement to an injunction in a measure referred to as injunction. In addition to
requesting injunctive relief in U.S. district courts, SEP holders may also pursue an im-
portation ban, or “exclusion order,” in administrative litigation before the ITC. If an
SEP holder initiates an ITC investigation in parallel with a district court case, we re-
fer to this as parallel ITC litigation. Further, an SEP holder may pursue an injunction
in parallel litigation filed in another country. Particularly if the parties’ dispute arises
from negotiation of a global SEP license, the prospect of a sales ban in a major foreign
market can affect licensing negotiations in the U.S. We refer to this measure as relevant
litigation abroad.
Next, SEP licensors may take strategic advantage of the lack of complete vertical
integration among technology firms. Because standards implementation is typically
carried out by a component (such as a chipset or module) that is incorporated into
a larger end product, SEPs (if valid and truly essential) are commonly infringed by
multiple firms along the supply chain. This fact opens the door for a number of re-
lated opportunistic behaviors. For one, SEP licensors can strategically elect to sue (or
target for license demands) downstream firms. Relative to upstream component man-
ufacturers, downstream firms generally sell larger products at higher price points and,
moreover, are often disadvantaged due to a lack of familiarity with the technical de-
tails of the standard and the standard-compliant component. While in theory the same
royalty can be calculated by applying both a relatively small rate to a relatively large
base and a relatively large rate to a relatively small base, patent owners in practice are
likely to recover more in damages when they sue firms that sell end products.14 In re-
sponse to this concern and in recognition of the long-standing requirement that patent
damages be properly “apportioned” to cover only the patented technology at issue in
the case,15 U.S. courts have ruled that reasonable royalty damages should ordinarily
be calculated using the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” (SSPPU) in an accused
multi-component product as the royalty base, rather than the price of the end product
under the so-called “entire market value rule” (EMVR).16 Nonetheless, this general rule
has many exceptions, including when the patentee has a history of negotiating and exe-
cuting licenses based on the sales price of end products.17 We capture situations where
the SEP enforcer bases its royalty calculations on the EMVR instead of the SSPPU in a
measure called EMVR vs. SSPUU.
14See Chao (2012) at pp. 119-25, 134-38 for a summary of the relevant literature. See also LaserDy-
namics, Inc. v. Quanta Comp., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Admission of . . . overall revenues,
which have no demonstrated correlation to the value of the patented feature alone, only serve to make a
patentee’s proffered damages amount appear modest by comparison, and to artificially inflate the jury’s
damages calculation beyond that which is ‘adequate to compensate for the infringement.”’).
15See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must in every case give evi-
dence tending to separate or apportion . . . the patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the
unpatented features.”).
16See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014); LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67
(“[I]t is generally required that royalties be based not on the entire product, but instead on the ‘smallest
salable patent-practicing unit.”’)
17CSIRO v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1301-04 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773
F.3d 1201, 1225-29 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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In addition to strategically targeting downstream firms that earn the most revenue,
licensors can make licensing demands from companies at multiple levels of the supply
chain. While in principle patent rights are said to “exhaust” once one level of the supply
chain is licensed,18 SEP licensors with large portfolios and complex, confidential licens-
ing histories can attempt to “double dip” by seeking overlapping royalties from firms at
different levels of the supply chain. We capture this type of behavior in a measure re-
ferred to in Table 1 as exhaustion. Moreover, licensors can increase pressure by pitting
firms at different supply chain levels against one another; for example, by threatening
to sue the customers of a potential licensee that has not accepted a licensing demand.
We refer to this as threats to sue customers.
Finally, SEP licensors may take strategic advantage of the lack of a (thick) market
for pricing SEP licenses and any resulting information asymmetries that cut in their
favor. For example, in negotiations or litigation, SEP licensors may selectively reveal
prior licenses that support what, in reality, is a relatively high royalty demand. While it
is a common practice in litigation to reference existing “comparable” licenses in calcu-
lating a reasonable royalty, the extent to which any given license is truly “comparable”
is often controversial due to differences in patents covered, the duration of the agree-
ment, geographic coverage, licensee type, etc. This provides the opportunity for the
SEP enforcer to rely on existing licensing agreements that result in more favorable roy-
alty calculations than what would result from accounting for any relevant differences
in the technology use. We capture this type of behavior in our prior licenses not compa-
rable measure. Relatedly, SEP licensors may simply refuse to disclose any information
justifying the requested royalty payment (or place conditions on the receipt of such in-
formation that no reasonable licensee would accept). This situation is captured by our
no disclosure measure in Table 1.
4 Data
4.1 Standards and SEPs
To identify SEPs, we utilized the Searle Center Database on Technology Standards and
Standard Setting Organizations, which includes 139,620 patents declared essential to
one or more standards developed by 16 SSOs and patent pools, including ETSI, IEEE,
and ITU (Baron and Spulber, 2018; Baron and Pohlmann, 2018). In addition, because
the declaration of a single patent is generally regarded as a declaration of the patent’s
entire family,19 we identified all family members of the specific patents included in the
Searle database using EPO’s Patstat database (version September 2019)20 and added
to our data all such patents that were not already included.
18See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017).
19ETSI’s IPR FAQ, for example, instructs that “[t]he recommended practice is to declare only one
member in a patent family . . . and let the system expand automatically as new members appear under
this patent family.”
20We use the DOCDB family definition.
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Table 1: Overview of measures of opportunistic conduct by SEP enforcers
Opportunistic behavior Description
Any opportunistic behavior
Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent
enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of oppor-
tunistic behavior or something that might constitute a FRAND
violation?
Untimely declaration
Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its
predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the
standard was adopted?
Overdeclaration
Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent
enforcer required licensees of relevant SEPs to additionally pay
royalties for rights to patents that were either not essential to
the relevant standardized technology generally or not relevant
to the accused infringer’s specific products?
Discriminatory license
Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the
patent enforcer adopted discriminatory or exclusionary licens-
ing terms or practices?
Injunction
In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer ex-
pressly request an injunction?
Parallel ITC litigation
Did the patent enforcer initiate an investigation against the ac-
cused infringer at the ITC in parallel to the district court litiga-
tion?
Relevant litigation abroad
Did the patent enforcer seek injunctive relief against the ac-
cused infringer in related litigation filed outside the U.S. (e.g.,
in Germany)?
EMVR vs. SSPUU
Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer im-
properly attempted to base the royalty owed on the price of
the end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a
component/module (the SSPPU).
Exhaustion
Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent
was already licensed (e.g., by an upstream component sup-
plier)?
Threats to sue customers
Did the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers
into the licensing dispute, either by contacting them, threaten-
ing to sue them, or actually suing them?
Prior licenses not comparable
Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer im-
properly attempted to base the royalty owed on prior licenses
that were not reasonably comparable (due to differences in
patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc).
No disclosure
Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the
patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior
licenses with similarly situated companies?
Other
Did the accused infringer specifically allege that some other
action might constitute a FRAND violation?
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4.2 SEP Litigation Data
To identify all U.S. patent suits involving SEPs, we first extracted from the MaxVal Patent
Litigation Databank21 basic case-level data on all patent cases filed in U.S. district courts
between 2010 and 2019. We then identified all such cases in which a declared SEP or
its family member was asserted or challenged.22 In addition to simply matching our
databases by patent number, we reviewed each match by hand to verify its accuracy.23
Next, we conducted an in depth analysis of each case involving at least one verified,
declared SEP. To do this, we reviewed each case’s docket, including all pleadings filed
in the case, all motions filed in the case,24 court rulings on those motions, trial verdicts,
and post-trial motions practice.25
During this review, we identified all parties to each case and confirmed which party
or parties were enforcing (or attempting to license) each patent and which party or par-
ties were accused of infringing each patent (or seeking a declaration of non-infringement
or invalidity). Further, we determined how and when each patent-party infringement
allegation was resolved, and additionally made note of all substantive rulings (whether
dispositive or not) concerning each patent-party pair.26
In addition, we identified all cases that were created by virtue of a prior case’s
transfer or the severance of patents or parties from a prior case. We further identified
all cases that were dismissed and subsequently re-filed in substantially identical form or
merged into another case. Accordingly, our data allows us to follow each patent-party
pair across multiple “cases” (i.e., unique case numbers) and identify the initial filing
date, final termination type and date, and all other relevant data aggregated across all
intervening case dockets.
To provide one relatively simple example, consider Princeton Digital Image Corp. v.
Canon, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00029 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2010). Princeton Digital filed this
case to enforce two patents against five accused infringers. Two defendants, Kodak
and Canon, settled with Princeton Digital in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and the case
against the remaining three defendants was later transferred to the Southern District
of New York in 2012. In this “new” case, Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., No. 1:12-cv-00779 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012), one additional defendant,
Xerox, settled in 2013, and the remaining two defendants, HP and Fujifilm, continued
to litigate to a decision on the merits in 2015 (in which they proved that the asserted
patents were not infringed due to a prior license to Microsoft). Thus, while a standard
21https://www.maxval.com/litigation-databank/
22Accordingly, our data does not include cases enforcing “undeclared” standard essential patents—that
is, patents that were not declared to the SSO but nonetheless were alleged by their current owner to be
infringed by the standard.
23In the process, we dropped a number of erroneous matches caused by inaccuracies among Chinese
patent numbers included in the Searle database.
24Including all motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions concerning expert witness
reports or testimony, and all pre-trial reports and motions in limine.
25However, we did not collect data on appeals.
26Our patent-party-level data is current as of June 2020. Accordingly, we observe cases for different
lengths of time, and some cases remained unresolved at that time. We take potential truncation into
account in our analysis.
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case-level database would include one 2010 case that was transferred in 2012 and a
second 2012 case that was resolved on the merits in 2015, our data provides a richer,
more accurate view of what transpired. In our data, this litigation is represented by ten
patent-party pairs, all of which were initiated in 2010, and two of which were settled
in 2010, two of which were settled in 2011, two of which were settled in 2013, and
four of which were litigated to a decision on the merits in 2015.
4.3 Party, Technology, and Product Data
In addition to data on litigation events, we identified the relationship between each
set of litigants, as well as the technology and product(s) or service(s) at issue in each
patent-party-level infringement allegation. Using the Stanford NPE database we cat-
egorized each patent enforcer as an operating technology company (i.e., a “practic-
ing entity” (PE)), a “non-practicing entity” (NPEs), a university, or a sovereign patent
fund.27 For each operating technology company, we further classified its relationship to
the accused infringer as one of the following: (i) direct product market competitor, (ii)
upstream of the accused infringer, (iii) downstream of the accused infringer, or (iv) par-
ticipant in a different product market. We also recorded whether court filings indicated
that the litigants had previously been parties to an SEP licensing agreement. Finally,
using the USPTO’s Patent Assignment Search and the Searle database, we constructed
each patent enforcer’s complete SEP holdings throughout our sample period, as well as
each individual SEP’s chain of ownership from filing to assertion.
Next, using both the standard declarations in the Searle database and the pleadings
filed in each case, we categorized the type(s) of standardized technology that was ac-
cused of infringement in each case. Our technology classification methodology, which
is described in detail in Appendix A, distinguishes among cases that involve wireless
communication, data compression and encoding, and digital broadcasting standards
(among others).
For each patent-party pair, we also determined whether the accused infringer was
alleged to have sold the technology in a product or service or whether instead the
accused infringer was alleged to have used the technology in a context substantially
unrelated to its core products or services (e.g., if infringement was limited to a non-
tech company’s website or advertisements).
For each patent-party pair where the accused infringer was alleged to have sold
the technology, we classified the accused infringer’s product(s) or service(s) and made
note of whether the infringing technology was substantially confined to a component
of each product or whether instead each product was, itself, a component (such as a
chip, chipset, or module) designed to implement the infringing technology. Our product
and service classification methodology, which is described in detail in Appendix A, dis-
tinguishes among infringement allegations against mobile devices, network hardware,
network/Internet/wireless service providers, televisions, set-top boxes/DVRs/video disc
players, media service providers, cameras, and software (among others).
27https://npe.law.stanford.edu/
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4.4 Data on Opportunistic Behaviors
To complete our database, we collected data on the measures of opportunistic con-
duct listed in Table 1. We began by collecting data on requests to ban the sale of
allegedly infringing products. For each patent-party pair, we noted whether the patent
enforcer specifically requested an injunction in the complaint (or counterclaim) alleging
infringement of the relevant patent.28 In addition, we identified (using DocketNaviga-
tor29) whether the patent enforcer filed a (parallel) complaint with the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission requesting that the accused infringer’s products be excluded
from importation into the U.S. because they infringe the relevant patent. Finally, we
noted whether the accused infringer alleged in U.S. case filings that the patent enforcer
attempted to obtain a sales ban in litigation filed in a foreign jurisdiction (primarily
Germany).30
Next, we searched the pleadings and motions filed in each case to determine whether
the accused infringer alleged that the patent enforcer otherwise breached its FRAND
obligations or engaged in opportunistic behavior with the aim to inflate the royalties it
might recover from licensing each asserted SEP. Here, we ignored general allegations
of unspecified FRAND violations and boilerplate assertions of the applicability of cer-
tain defenses, and instead only made note of specific factual allegations (as explained
in greater detail below).
First, we observed a population of patent-party-level claims in which the accused
infringer alleged, citing specific facts, that the asserted SEP rights were “exhausted” —
i.e., that the SEP was, in fact, already licensed by an upstream supplier or was covered
by a license that the accused infringer negotiated in the past with a prior owner or
licensor of the SEP. To be clear, while generic assertions of exhaustion or license were
pled in many cases, we limited our selection to only those allegations that identified
specific prior agreements or specific upstream suppliers believed to hold a license. For
example, we did not make note of common, generic “placeholder” allegations such as:
“On information and belief, some or all of Defendant’s accused products are licensed
under the patent-in-suit and/or subject to the doctrines of patent exhaustion and im-
plied license.” Rather, the cases that we identify below as pleading exhaustion included
allegations such as: “Dolby’s claims are barred by license, including a license of the
patents-in-suit pursuant to a license agreement between Research In Motion Limited
and Via Licensing Corporation.”31
28To be clear, we did not count broad, boilerplate requests for “such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper.” Our metric is limited to pleadings that expressly request, for example,
“[a]n order enjoining [the accused infringer] and its officers, agents, servants and employees, privies,
and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from further infringement of said [SEPs].”
29https://brochure.docketnavigator.com/
30We did not search databases of foreign patent litigation to identify parallel foreign cases. Few such
databases exist, and those that do exist are typically incomplete in temporal and/or geographic coverage.
31Answer at 9, Dolby Int’l AB v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-02931 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
See also Answer at 17, Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp., No. 2:14-cv-00033 (E.D. Tex.
July 7, 2014) (“[B]y their participation in the PacketCable IPR agreements, GENBAND and Nortel and
its affiliates have granted to all PacketCable signatories, including Metaswitch, a fully-paid, royalty-free,
non-exclusive license (with a sublicense to end-users of licensed products) to their patents and other
intellectual property practiced through compliance with the PacketCable specifications and technology.”).
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We additionally identified a population of patent-party-level claims in which the
accused infringer alleged, again citing specific facts, that the SEP enforcer sought to
license the patent on a discriminatory basis in violation of FRAND commitments. Again,
while generic allegations of FRAND violations were common, we limited our selection
to only those cases that provided specific factual support for the allegation that the SEP
enforcer’s pre-suit royalty demands were discriminatory or exclusionary. To provide
an example, it was alleged in one case that the SEP licensor had “offered the license
to the SISVEL Patent Pool patents at different, discriminatory prices . . . [with] [t]he
apparent purpose of . . . . rais[ing] costs to competitors of Philips in the MP2-audio-
enabled product and MP3-audio-enabled product markets (which includes [the accused
infringer]), and to drive out competition in the MP2-audio-enabled product and MP3-
audio-enabled product markets.”32
We also made note of all patent-party-level claims in which the accused infringer
pled with specificity that the SEP enforcer engaged in “overdeclaration” by requiring
licensees—as a condition for obtaining a license to relevant SEPs—to additionally pay
royalties for rights to patents that were either not essential to the relevant standard-
ized technology generally or not relevant to the accused infringer’s specific products.
One such allegation, for example, stated that the SEP licensor “has periodically re-
moved expired patents and submitted new patents to extend the lifespan of the ATSC
patent portfolio . . . without notice or comment from licensees and without indepen-
dent third-party evaluation to ensure essentiality,” including “46 patents [added] since
October 2015 that relate to broadcasting and transmitting over-the-air signals to ATSC-
compliant receivers . . . zero [of which] are required for [the accused infringer] (or any
other DTV manufacturer or seller) to make its DTVs ATSC compliant because its DTVs
do not broadcast signals.”33
We further identified all patent-party-level claims in defense of which the accused in-
fringer alleged, citing specific facts, that the SEP enforcer (or its predecessor-in-interest)
failed to disclose the SEP to the standard-setting organization until after the standard’s
adoption (or initially declared the asserted patent non-essential prior to the standard’s
adoption), despite actively participating in the selection of technology for inclusion in
the standard. In one such example, it was alleged that “four days after the filing of the
Reissue Application which later issued as the [asserted SEP], [the SEP enforcer] sub-
mitted [a] letter to the chairman of the 802.11 working group stating, inter alia, that
[none of its] ‘patent[s] are necessary for the implementation of devices incorporating
the IEEE802.11b draft standard’ . . . [and when] [t]he IEEE 802.11 working group met
again in November 1998 . . . . [the SEP enforcer’s] president and CEO . . . continued to
represent that it believed that the Reissue Application was not necessary to the practice
32Dell, Inc.’s Answer at 46, Audio MPEG, Inc. v. HP, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00073 (E.D. Va. July 15, 2016)
33Compl. at 21-22, Haier America Trading, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 1:17-cv-00921
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2017). See also, HP, Inc.’s Answer, Audio MPEG, Inc. v. HP, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00073
(E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2015) (pleading at 26 that “on information and belief, in addition to patents directed
at the MP3 Standard, the SISVEL Patent Pool includes patents directed at standards clearly unrelated to
and therefore not essential to MP3 Technology, including MPEG Audio Layers I and II, MPEG-2 patents,
and other technology different from and unrelated to MP3 Technology," and also at 36 that "[o]ver half
of the patents in the SISVEL Patent Pool have claims directed solely at encoders and/or transmission
systems, neither of which relates to all of HP’s products, which are mostly MP3 decoders”).
14
of 802.11b.”34 And in another, “at the time [the asserted SEPs’ original owner] was
seeking to have the SSOs incorporate its proposal into the CDMA2000 Standards, [the
original owner] (including one or more of its employee inventors) knew that it was si-
multaneously seeking patent coverage . . . [of] its technical proposal and/or the draft
CDMA2000 Standards” but “did not inform 3GPP2 or TTA until November 2008 that
they believe that the [7 asserted SEPs] may fully or partially cover elements of, or be
essential or potentially essential to the CDMA2000 Standards.”35
Likewise, we identified all patent-party-level claims that included an allegation that
the SEP licensor improperly attempted to pressure the accused infringer by involv-
ing its customers in the dispute. In one such case, the accused infringer pled that
“in a blatant attempt to force [us] to pay excessive non-FRAND rates, [SEP licensor]
reached out to [our] customers and downstream manufacturers,"36 and in another,
the alleged infringer accused the SEP holder of making “false and defamatory state-
ments . . . during meetings with [potential customers] . . . [including] that Metaswitch’s
products infringed GENBAND’s patents, . . . that Metaswitch could not sell noninfring-
ing products[,] . . . that GENBAND would utilize this lawsuit to put Metaswitch out of
business[, and] . . . that this lawsuit would prevent Metaswitch from being able to make
an initial public stock offering.”37
Finally, we identified all patent-party-level claims in which the accused infringer
alleged in pleadings or argued in motions that the SEP holder sought to strategically
influence the calculation of the royalty itself. While we were able to identify a popu-
lation of cases in which it was specifically alleged in the pleadings that the SEP holder
improperly sought to base the royalty owed on the entire market value of the accused
end product or by reference to a not-reasonably-comparable prior license,38 this data
was commonly not reflected in the case record until after the production of expert wit-
ness reports,39 by which time many cases had already settled. We address in greater
34Answer at 17, WI-LAN, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-00453 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2011).
35Answer at 44, SPH America, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-02318 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2014).
36See, e.g., Compl. at 27, U-Blox AG v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00001 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 1, 2019)
37Answer at 49, Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp., No. 2:14-cv-00033 (E.D. Tex. filed
July 7, 2014).
38See, e.g., Answer to 2d Am. Compl. at 18-19, Sisvel Int’l SA v. Dell, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-01247 (D. Del.
May 4, 2020) (“Sisvel does not offer any licenses to cover component-part products, and instead pursues
inflated royalties by licensing end-user devices only . . . Sisvel expressly refused to offer any license to
Sierra Wireless that would cover any component parts, stating that ‘Sisvel does not license components’
and . . . . Sisvel maintained this position even after Sierra Wireless . . . repeatedly requested that Sisvel
offer a license on FRAND terms to cover component parts.”); Answer at 28/29, Motorola Mobility, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., No. 3:10-cv-00699 (W.D. Wis.) (“Motorola has discriminatorily chosen Microsoft’s
Xbox product line and other multi-function, many-featured products and software . . . for the purpose of
extracting unreasonable royalties from Microsoft . . . By letter to Microsoft, dated October 29, 2010, Kirk
Dailey, Motorola’s Corporate Vice President Intellectual Property, stated that a royalty for a license to
its identified patents must be based on ‘the price of the end product (e.g., each Xbox 360 product, each
PC/laptop, each smartphone, etc.) and not on component software (e.g., Xbox 360 system software,
Windows 7 software, Windows Phone 7 software, etc.)”’).
39See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures II, LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, LP, No. 2:17-cv-00662, at *5-6 (E.D. Tex.
April 26, 2019) (“Defendants contend that [IV’s damages expert’s] analysis of the Ericsson licenses is
unreliable because he does not account for the technological and economic differences between the hy-
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detail below how we account for this effect, generally. Relatedly, we also identified
a population of cases in which the accused infringer specifically alleged that the SEP
licensor unreasonably refused to disclose evidence of the market value of the SEPs as-
serted.40
5 Results
5.1 Case filings and outcomes
Figure 1 shows the total number of court cases during our sample period 2010-2019 at
the patent-party level—that is, counting each plaintiff-defendant-patent combination
as a separate case (see the example at the end of Section 4.2 above). Our data includes
a total of 1,809 cases, meaning that an average of 180 SEP patent-party-level infringe-
ment allegations were initiated each year during the period of our study. Figure 1 also
distinguishes between cases involving NPEs and PEs, and we see that the majority of
SEP assertions were initiated by NPEs (around 70%). Table A-1 in the appendix further
shows that eight of the top 10 SEP enforcers (ranked by number of patent-party-level
infringement allegations made 2010-2019) were NPEs. NPE Acacia tops the list with
286 cases, nearly 16% of all SEP assertions brought between 2010 and 2019.41
In the appendix, we include two additional figures and two additional tables. Figure
A-1 compares the number of district court cases with the number of parallel cases filed
at the ITC, and Figure A-2 shows assertions per SEP broken down by both the SEP
enforcer’s NPE status and the SSO to which the SEP was declared essential. The latter
figure reveals that NPEs bring many more cases per SEP than operating companies
and, moreover, rarely if ever assert patents declared essential to standards organized
as patent pools, such as ATSC, BlueRay, DvD, and MPEG DASH.42
Relatedly, Table A-1 shows that SEP assertions are relatively concentrated among a
group of especially litigious SEP enforcers. The top 20 asserting entities alone account
for almost 85% of all (patent-party level) cases. While many potential SEP licensees
pothetical and actual licenses . . . [including] that the Ericsson licenses involve royalties for third-party
handset sales, whereas the hypothetical license involves functionality in the base stations and the base-
band processor in the handsets . . . [and] that comparing one group of patents that is representative of
thousands of patents to the six patents-in-suit ignores the value of the vast majority of patents in the
portfolio.”); Saint Lawrence Comm’ns, LLC v. ZTE Corp., No. 2:15-cv-00349, at *3, *8 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2017) (“Motorola argues that [SLC’s damages expert’s] reliance on the two LG [licensing] proposals is
flawed . . . [because] the two LG proposals substantially differ from the ultimate agreement reached by
SLC and LG, almost by a factor of ten[, and] . . . Motorola challenges [SLC’s damages expert’s] discussion
of other SLC licenses negotiated in the context of litigation in Germany [because] . . . these licenses are
unreliable indicators of a FRAND royalty because they are ’tainted by the coercive environment of patent
litigation,’ specifically, the threat of an injunction in Germany.”).
40See, e.g., Am. Answer at 38, Nokia Tech. Oy v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01440 (E.D. Tex March 20,
2017); Am. Compl. at 10, Sonus Networks, Inc. v. Inventergy, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00322 (N.D. Cal. March
10, 2015).
41We aggregate NPE assertions at the NPE group level. Accordingly, these are aggregate statistics for
all patent-enforcing subsidiaries of Acacia Research Corp.
42The distribution of court cases across SSOs is shown in Table A-3 in the appendix.
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Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The graph shows the number of cases (at the patent-party-case level) that
involve SEPs by NPE status between 2010 and 2019.
also find themselves in multiple litigations, Table A-2 shows that SEP assertions are a bit
less concentrated on the defense side, with the top 20 accused infringers accounting for
67% of lawsuits. Viewed together, Tables A-1 and A-2 also show that some operating
tech companies—including Ericsson, Huawei, Samsung, and Nokia43—regularly find
themselves involved in SEP litigation on both sides of the “v.” as both SEP enforcers
and accused infringers.
Figure 2 breaks down the patent-party-level case count by technology area. For
both NPEs and PEs, two technology areas account for a large majority of cases: wireless
communication and compression/encoding. Collectively, these two categories account
for 75% of cases brought by PEs and 93% by NPEs. Among PEs, media broadcast
technology also accounts for a significant share of court cases (23%).
43We categorize each SEP enforcer as a practicing or non-practicing entity based on whether the com-
pany sells goods or services, generally. We do not (and as a practical manner cannot across all cases)
analyze whether each SEP was practiced by the patentee in its products or services at the time of en-
forcement.
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Figure 2: Case shares by technology (2010-2019)


















Share of court cases
Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The graph shows the share of cases by allegedly infringing technology in
cases that involve SEPs between 2010 and 2019.
In Figure 3 we take a closer look at the products and services accused of infringe-
ment in each case. PEs enforcing SEPs most commonly target mobile devices (i.e.,
smartphones and tablets), televisions, and network hardware. These products are ac-
cused of infringement in 28%, 22%, and 15% of patent-party-level cases, respectively.
NPEs also commonly target mobile devices (39%) and network hardware (16%), but
also bring a significant share of cases against providers of wireless/network services
(18%).
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Figure 3: Case shares by product/service (2010-2019)




































Share of court cases
Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The graph shows the share of cases by allegedly infringing product/service
in cases that involve SEPs between 2010 and 2019.
Figure 4 combines information on technology and products/services (from Figures
2 and 3) to present a breakdown of the products and services targeted in patent-party-
level cases enforcing patents declared essential to wireless communication and com-
pression/encoding standards. In cases involving wireless communication standards,
we see that infringement allegations most commonly accuse mobile devices (45%),
network hardware (21%), and wireless/network services (19%). Recall from Figure 3
that the latter is driven by NPE assertions. A relatively small share of cases (7%) are
brought against companies that produce product components such as chips, modules,
and network cards. By contrast, cases enforcing patents declared essential to com-
pression/encoding standards specifically accuse a much broader range of products and
services, though the primary target remains mobile devices here, too. In neither cat-
egory do we see a significant share of cases targeting IoT products, despite the rapid
growth of those markets in recent years. This is likely explained by the typical delay
between product introduction and patent assertion in court.
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Figure 4: Case shares by selected technology and product/service (2010-2019)
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Note: The graph shows the share of cases by allegedly infringing product/service in cases that involve SEPs between for “wireless
communication” and “compression/encoding” for 2010-2019.
Next, we take a look at case outcomes. As described in greater detail above, our
data allows us to track case outcomes at the patent-party level so that, for example,
if a given SEP holder accuses two companies of infringing two SEPs in a single case,
we track outcomes for all four company-SEP pairs. Figure 5 shows outcomes for all
(patent-party level) cases in our data. Not surprisingly, the most common outcome by
far is settlement (72% of PE SEP assertions and 76% for NPEs). Moreover, we observe
that PE SEP assertions are slightly more likely to result in a substantive ruling—i.e., a
ruling on infringement and/or validity grounds—relative to cases involving NPEs (6.8%
for PEs vs. 4.3% for NPEs, a difference that is statistically significant at 5%). Cases
brought by PEs are also significantly more likely to terminate due to non-substantive
rulings—i.e., rulings on a basis other than infringement or validity, such as the defense
of exhaustion or failure to prove ownership of the SEP (17.4% for PEs vs. 4.7% for
NPEs). Figure A-4 in the appendix further breaks down our outcome data by technology
area. There, the media broadcast and virtual private network technology areas stand
out due to relatively large shares of cases with non-substantive and substantive rulings,
respectively. However, both effects are largely driven by groups of related cases with
similar outcomes: among media broadcast cases, our outcome results are largely driven
by a single suit between LG and Haier that involved a exceptionally large number of
SEPs, and our VPN category consists entirely of a series of high-stakes cases brought by
VirnetX that were litigated with exceptional intensity.
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Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The graph shows case outcomes at the patent-party-case level of cases that
involve SEPs between 2010 and 2019.
In Figure 6, we focus on cases that reached a dispositive decision on the issue of
infringement or invalidity.44 The left-hand-side figure shows stark differences in the
substantive outcomes of cases brought by NPEs and PEs. Of NPE SEP cases litigated
to a decision on the merits, 46% concluded because all SEP claims remaining in the
case were invalidated, 17% concluded because all SEP claims remaining in the case
were found not infringed, and just 37% concluded with a determination that at least
one claim of the SEP was both valid and infringed. Relative to these statistics, PE SEP
enforcement actions were substantially less likely to be litigated to a dispositive decision
of invalidity (6%), substantially more likely to be litigated to a dispositive decision of
non-infringement (48.5%), and slightly more likely to conclude with a decision that at
least one SEP claim was both valid and infringed (45%).
Combining the outcome data on the left with data on cases decided on the basis
of exhaustion or (lack of) ownership, the right-hand-side of Figure 6 shows case out-
comes coded on a simple win/loss basis. Among SEP cases for which we could assign
a win/loss designation, NPEs lost 80% of the time. By comparison, PEs prevailed more
often, but still lost about two-thirds of cases for which we could assign a winner and
loser. Figure A-5 in the appendix shows that the majority of decided cases (just like
the majority of all cases) involve wireless communication and compression/encoding
standards. Among all decided wireless communication cases, the SEP holder won 24%
of the time, compared to 12% of the time in compression/encoding cases.
44To be clear, our data is limited to outcomes in the first instance. We do not observe appellate out-
comes, if any.
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SEP enforcer won Accused infringer won
Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The left-hand-side graph shows dispositive case outcomes at the patent-
party-case level of cases that involve SEPs between 2010 and 2019. The righ-hand-side graph shows overall case outcomes coded
as win/loss at the patent-party-case level of cases that involve SEPs between 2010 and 2019.
5.2 Evidence of opportunistic conduct by SEP enforcers
We begin by providing an overview of the prevalence with which we observed actual
or alleged opportunistic behavior in our case data. Table 2 shows the share of NPE and
PE cases (again defined at the patent-party level) with publicly available court filings
specifically referencing each of the opportunistic behaviors described above in Section
3. In the appendix, we present identical statistics for the entire sample of cases (Table
A-4) and broken down by district court (Table A-5). Figure A-3 additionally plots the
share of cases in which each behavior was observed or alleged over the sample period
2010-2019.
In interpreting these numbers, it is important to keep in mind that disclosure of
opportunistic behaviors is, to varying extents, a function of the information that litiga-
tion generates over time. This means that our data tends to under-count opportunistic
behavior in court cases that are resolved relatively quickly, before the parties filed docu-
ments with the court revealing those behaviors. We account for this in two ways. First,
we distinguish among different strategic behaviors that are commonly revealed at dif-
ferent stages of the litigation process. For example, while an assertion of entitlement to
injunctive relief is typically made (or not) in the SEP holder’s initial complaint, a major-
ity of the behaviors that we study are not revealed until the accused infringer answers
the complaint, and even then often not until the accused infringer files an amended
version of the answer incorporating additional details discovered in the early stages of
litigation. Second, we condition our data on multiple milestones in the litigation pro-
cess. As shown further below in Tables 2, 5, 7, and 8, we separately examine the subset
of cases in which the accused infringer filed at least one answer to the complaint, the
subset of cases in which the court ruled on at least one substantive motion (i.e., a mo-
tion for summary judgement of noninfringement or invalidity, or motion to dismiss on
patentable subject matter grounds), and finally the subset of cases that were litigated
for more than one year.
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Another potential challenge lies with the fact that we observe many behaviors only
through allegations made by accused infringers in pleadings and motions. While (as
discussed above in Section 4.4) we strictly limit our data to specific allegations of op-
portunistic behavior, there is nonetheless a risk that these allegations may sometimes be
exaggerated or erroneous. We address this challenge in two ways as well. First, we dis-
tinguish between measures, on the one hand, that are based on objective information,
such as the existence of a parallel ITC investigation, and on the other hand, measures
that are more difficult (if not impossible) to verify, such as alleged exhaustion of the
asserted patent rights. Second, we analyze variation across cases for each measure as a
function of objective, observable litigant characteristics. We ask, for example, whether
exhaustion is more likely to be alleged when the accused infringer merely purchased
a component embodying the standardized technology, and whether overdeclaration is
more likely to be alleged against SEP holders with relatively large portfolios of declared
SEPs.
Returning to Table 2, the first row shows our summary measure any opportunistic
behavior. This variable is equal to 1 if any of the measures of opportunistic behavior ap-
plies. We see that in 83% of SEP cases brought by PEs, at least one type of opportunistic
behavior is observed or alleged. The share does not change much when we limit the
sample to cases in which the accused infringer filed at least one pleading. However, the
share increases to almost 98% if we further limit the sample to cases that were litigated
through the filing of at least one substantive motion (which demonstrates the issue dis-
cussed above). We also see that this measure of opportunistic behavior is substantially
lower for cases brought by NPEs (72.5%), and this difference is statistically significant
at 1%.
Looking at the individual measures of opportunistic behavior, we see that PEs allege
that they are entitled to an injunctions in more than half of their cases (56%), while
NPEs do so in only 39%.45 However, this difference likely reflects the fact that NPEs
are unlikely to obtain injunctive relief following the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay,
Inc. v. mercExchange, LLC46 (Seaman, 2016). Table A-7 in the appendix also shows
that PEs are much more likely to request injunctions in complaints against downstream
companies, relative to complaints against direct product market competitors.
While our data suggests that opportunistic behaviors tend to arise less often in NPE
cases, untimely declaration stands out as a major exception. Depending on the sample
considered, untimely declaration is alleged in 22-45% of NPE cases compared to just
10-14% of PE cases. The fact that untimely declaration is alleged more often against
NPEs is also reflected in Table A-6, which shows that untimely SEP declarations are al-
leged much more often in cases where there is no prior licensing relationship between
the SEP enforcer and accused infringer (22%, compared to 3% when there was a prior
license between the litigants), which is true in virtually all NPE cases. Moreover, Table
A-8 in the appendix indicates that untimely declaration is not commonly alleged in cases
litigated between two PEs that both sometimes enforce, and sometimes are accused of
45To be clear, we refer here to specific requests for injunction relief made in pleadings—i.e., complaints
and counterclaims–rather than motions for preliminary or permanent injunctions.
46547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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infringing, SEPs.47 We also find that untimely declaration is not alleged in any cases in-
volving most technology categories and, instead, shows up primarily in cases involving
wireless communication standards (see Table A-9).
Compared to untimely declaration, NPEs are far less likely to be accused of overdec-
laration, i.e. asserting declared SEPs that may in fact not be standard-essential. PEs
are alleged to engage in this strategy in around a quarter of cases. While this only re-
flects an allegation made by accused infringers, our data on dispositive case outcomes
supports the veracity of these allegations. Overdeclaration was not alleged in a sin-
gle case in which infringement was proven. By contrast, of all decided cases in which
overdeclaration was alleged, half ended in a decision of invalidity and the other half
resulted in a decision of non-infringement. Also, Table A-8 shows that overdeclaration
is less common in cases litigated between two PEs that both sometimes enforce, and
sometimes are accused of infringing, SEPs (compared to cases with a patent enforcer
that also shows up in our data as an accused infringer, and an accused infringer that
only shows up in our data in that role).
Exhaustion is specifically pled in around a third of court cases brought by PEs (com-
pared to 17% of cases brought by NPEs). Table A-6 shows that exhaustion is claimed
more often in cases where the accused infringer uses the technology in a context sub-
stantially unrelated to its core products or services (e.g., if infringement was limited to
a non-tech company’s website or advertisements), compared to cases with an accused
infringer than sells the technology as part of its core product or service. Exhaustion
is pled in 33% of the former and 20% of the latter. The table further shows that ex-
haustion is pled more often by accused infringers that merely incorporate in their own
products an allegedly infringing component sourced from an upstream vendor. Relat-
edly, Table A-8 in the appendix shows that exhaustion is claimed more often by accused
infringers that operate downstream from the companies enforcing SEPs against them.
Additionally, and consistent with this finding, Table A-10 reports that allegations of ex-
haustion are particularly prevalent in cases against wireless/network service providers
— firms that sit near the end of two supply chains (one for mobile devices and another
for network hardware).
Discriminatory licensing is alleged in around 20% of cases brought by PEs and only
4% of NPE cases. Table A-6 indicates that this argument arises mostly in situations
where there is a prior licensing relationship between the SEP enforcer and accused
infringer. We also observe that it occurs mostly among product market competitors
(Table A-7) and in situations where accused infringers are not themselves SEP licen-
sors (Table A-8). Further, Table A-9 indicates that this behavior occurs mostly in media
broadcast technologies and to a lesser extent in wireless communication and compres-
sion/encoding.
Another way in which SEP owners can exert pressure on companies that sell standard-
compliant products and services is to threaten their customers with patent infringement
suits. However, Table 2 indicates that this is a relatively rare move that was alleged in
47That is, in cases where (i) the plaintiff shows up in our data asserting SEPs in one or more cases and
shows up in our data as an accused SEP infringer in one or more cases, and (2) the defendant shows up
in our data asserting SEPs in one or more cases and shows up in our data as an accused SEP infringer in
one or more cases.
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less than 3% of cases. The only products affected by threats to sue customers were chips,
modules, network cards, and network hardware (Table A-10).
Yet another way to put pressure on accused infringers is to pursue them in more
than one venue. In addition to suing in U.S. district courts, SEP holders can initiate ITC
investigations in hopes of obtaining an exclusion order and can sue in the courts of one
or more additional countries (e.g., UK or Germany) in hopes of securing a sales ban in a
major market outside the U.S. We see that SEP enforcers additionally pursued accused
infringers in parallel ITC actions about 7% of the time, and we find references to foreign
litigation even less often (in just 3% of cases).48 Parallel ITC investigations occur more
often in cases between parties with a prior licensing agreement, 14% vs. 4% (Table
A-6) and parties that operate in different product markets (Table A-7). In addition, we
find that ITC investigations and foreign litigation occur most often in parallel with cases
involving wireless communication standards and cases that accuse mobile devices (i.e.,
smartphones and tablets) with infringement (Table A-9).
The remaining three measures of opportunistic litigation behavior capture issues
more directly related to the calculation of a royalty rate, which is often at the core of
the parties’ dispute in SEP cases. The EMVR vs. SSPUU variable captures situations
where the accused infringer argued that the SEP licensor improperly attempted to base
the royalty owed on the price of the end product (using the EMVR), rather than the
price of the standard-compliant component (the SSPPU). We find that this allegation is
relatively common, with accused infringers making this argument in around a quarter
of cases. In Table A-7, we also see that upstream SEP enforcers are more likely to base
their royalty request on the EMVR instead of the SSPUU. Additionally, as shown in Table
A-9, we observe this allegation exclusively in cases involving wireless communication,
compression/encoding, and VPN technologies.
Next, the prior licenses not comparable measure captures cases in which the accused
infringer argued that the SEP licensor improperly attempted to calculate the royalty
owed by reference to prior licensing agreements that were, in fact, not reasonably com-
parable due to differences in the set of licensed patents, duration, geographic scope,
licensee type, etc. We observed this argument in less than 15% of all cases in our data.
We also observe, as shown in Table A-6, that license comparability is raised almost
exclusively in cases between parties that lack a prior licensing history.
Finally, the no disclosure measure captures situations where the infringer indicated
that the SEP licensor refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situ-
ated companies. It turns out that this is not a common occurrence, with less than 2% of
cases alleging this conduct by SEP licensors. That said, our data only capture situations
where this issue is highlighted by accused infringers as a tactic that was employed to
exert pressure or otherwise inflate royalties.
The other category captures all other situations in which the accused infringer made
some specific allegation of behavior that it believed might constitute a FRAND violation.
48Note, however, that we only take into account litigation in foreign jurisdictions if it is explicitly
referred to by the defendants as a way of putting pressure on them. This means we are most likely
under-counting relevant litigation abroad.
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Table 2: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer by NPE status (2010-2019)
All D Response MSJ/MTD
Opportunistic behavior PE NPE PE NPE PE NPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior 83.52 72.52 83.29 80.46 97.91 90.00
2 Injunction 56.43 39.11 53.44 40.46 89.58 37.60
3 Untimely declaration 12.68 22.40 13.98 26.82 10.41 45.60
4 Overdeclaration 25.00 2.88 27.55 3.45 6.25 8.40
5 Exhaustion 32.95 17.01 36.32 20.37 58.33 24.00
6 Discriminatory license 19.12 4.21 21.08 5.04 6.25 4.00
7 Threats to sue customers 2.65 0.93 2.92 1.12 2.08 0
8 Parallel ITC litigation 7.19 4.37 6.05 4.48 2.08 7.20
9 Relevant litigation abroad 3.03 0.85 3.34 1.02 10.41 1.60
10 No disclosure 1.70 0.62 1.87 0.74 0 0
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 22.15 11.55 24.42 13.83 54.16 17.20
12 Prior licenses not comparable 13.44 6.08 14.82 7.28 50.00 17.20
13 Other 45.83 9.36 50.52 11.21 37.50 22.80
Total cases 528 1,281 479 1,070 48 250
Notes: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; D response: only cases
where the defendant filed at least one response to the complaint; MSJ/MTD: only cases where at least one motion, a motion to
dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment was filed; 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer
(specifically) allege that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something
that might constitute a FRAND violation? 2) In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3)
Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the
technology was adopted? 4) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer
to license (along with SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused infringer
(specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer
make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees? 7) Did
the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to
sue them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the ITC in parallel
to the district court litigation?; 9) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g.,
in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 10) Did the accused infringer make a
specific allegation that the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies?
11) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the
end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 12) Did the accused infringer argue
that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due
to differences in patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc). 13) Did the accused infringer make some other specific
allegation that something might be a FRAND violation?
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5.3 Determinants of opportunistic conduct
Next, we analyze the determinants of opportunistic litigation behavior. We start by
estimating the likelihood that a given type of opportunistic behavior is present in a
given case (at the patent-party level) using a linear probability model. In Appendix B,
we describe the variables that serve as potential determinants.
Table 3 shows the results for each measure of opportunistic behavior (columns (1)-
(13)) broken down by litigant-, case-, and patent-specific characteristics (in rows (1)-
(16)). Turning first to column (1), we note that opportunistic behavior, generally, is
positively associated with a prior license between the parties. This suggests that in
situations where a prior agreement has broken down or is up for renewal, the SEP
enforcer tends to behave more aggressively towards the accused infringer. Such cases
may in fact correspond directly to the original definition of holdup described in Section
2.2 above. An SEP enforcer’s overall SEP portfolio size is also positively associated
with opportunistic behavior, generally49—a finding that likely reflects these enforcers’
tendency to assert a larger set of SEPs. Indeed, as shown in column (4), portfolio
size is positively associated with allegations of overdeclarations. On the other hand,
column (1) also shows that opportunistic conduct is observed less often in cases with:
an accused infringer that is both a licensor and licensee of SEP; an accused infringer
that uses, rather than sells, the allegedly infringing technology; or litigants that are
product market competitors.
Turning next to the litigant characteristics that comprise the first nine rows of Table
3, we see in row (1) that cases filed by NPEs are (relative to PE cases) more likely to
include disputes about both the appropriate royalty base to use (EMVR v. SSPPU), and
the comparability of prior licenses that may be introduced into evidence at trial. At
the same time, NPEs are also less likely to request injunctive relief, assert potentially
exhausted patent rights, or threaten accused infringers’ downstream customers.
Rows (2) and (3) present results for cases with a litigant that appears in our data
in some cases as the SEP enforcer and in other cases as the accused infringer. In cases
with an SEP enforcer that appears in our data as both an SEP licensor and licensee
(row (2)), we are less likely to observe disputes about the EMVR and the comparability
of licenses. On the other hand, we find that such cases are more likely to proceed in
parallel with foreign litigation. When we look instead at cases with an accused infringer
that is both an SEP licensor and licensee (row (3)), our results differ. In these cases,
we see fewer allegations of untimely declaration, overdeclaration, and discriminatory
licensing, but greater reliance on the EMVR, licenses of questionable comparability, and
parallel litigation (both at the ITC and in foreign courts).
Rows (4), (5), and (6) show that opportunistic behaviors also vary with litigants’ re-
lationship to one another. In cases with an SEP enforcer that operates upstream relative
to the accused infringer (row (4)), we observe requests for injunctions less often, but
see an increase in allegations of overdeclaration and greater reliance on the EMVR and
49Note that our measure of SEP portfolio size varies over time at the case-level as we account for patent
transfers; we compute the portfolio size for each case at the time the lawsuit is filed which mitigates
concerns that the portfolio size reflects at least in part a SEP enforcer’s response to the outcome of a
given case.
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licenses of questionable comparability. In cases between litigants that, instead, are di-
rect product market competitors (row (5)), we see that SEP enforcers are more likely to
be accused of overdeclaration and discriminatory licensing, but are less likely to pursue
a sales ban in court or at the ITC. In addition, row (6) shows results for cases that arise
from the alleged breach of, or failure to renew, a prior licensing agreement between the
litigants. In these cases, we see an increased likelihood of injunction requests and ITC
investigations, as well as more frequent allegations of overdeclaration and exhaustion.
At the same time, these cases are less likely to include allegations of untimely disclosure
and disputes concerning the appropriate royalty base or the relevance of prior licenses.
Rows (7) and (8) further reveal that opportunism varies with the accused infringer’s
relationship with the allegedly infringing technology. As shown in row (7), cases brought
against accused infringers that use the standardized technology (e.g., in advertisements
or their website), rather than sell it as part of a core product or service, are more likely
to include specific allegations of exhaustion (as one would expect) and are more likely
to include a parallel ITC investigation. At the same time, however, cases against tech-
nology users are also less likely to involve allegations of overdeclaration, discriminatory
licensing, threats against the accused infringer’s customer, and strategic use of licenses
of questionable comparability. Further, row (8) presents results for cases filed against
companies that allegedly infringe simply by virtue of incorporating another firm’s (al-
legedly infringing) component in their own end product. In such cases, we see an
increase in allegations of overdeclaration and discriminatory licensing. We also see
that SEP enforcers in such cases are less likely to request injunctive relief in court, yet
more likely to pursue an exclusion order at the ITC.
Finally, row (9) presents results that take into account the size of each patent en-
forcer’s SEP portfolio. Here we see, as one would expect, that allegations of overdecla-
ration increase with the SEP enforcer’s portfolio size. We also find that SEP enforcers
with larger portfolios are more likely to pursue parallel ITC investigations and more
likely to base royalties on the entire value of accused products.
Our data additionally allows us address the possibility that the results shown in
Table 3 might reflect unobservables that are correlated with both opportunistic behavior
and party-, case-, or patent-specific characteristics. We do so, first, by including SEP
enforcer and technology fixed effects, which allow us to compare opportunistic behavior
across subsets of cases the involve the same SEP enforcer and the same same technology.
For example, when applying this method to Nokia, we compare across a set of six cases
related to wireless communication technology and, again, across two different cases in
which Nokia enforced SEPs covering compression/encoding technology.
Table 4 presents results that incorporate enforcer and technology fixed effects. Log-
ically, our sample size and list of determinants both shrink;50 however, we otherwise
see little difference in the results. While some determinants lose their statistical signif-
icance, few coefficients are significant in Table 4 but not in Table 3 and, more impor-
tantly, we see only a single sign flip among all statistically significant coefficients.51 On
50Our sample size shrinks because we must drop all SEP enforcers for which there is no variation
across court cases. Our variable list also shrinks because we must drop the P is NPE and P is both P and
D variables, which naturally do not vary within SEP enforcers.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the while, these results suggest that our findings are driven by within-case variation,
not unaccounted unobservables.
To provide a further check, we also present results in Table A-12 that rely exclusively
on within-case variation. Since our data includes many instances in which an SEP en-
forcer filed a single complaint enforcing the same SEPs against multiple, independent
defendants, we can examine variation in our measures of opportunistic behavior within
the same case. While this approach has the advantage of eliminating case-level unob-
servables, it also presents a number of complexities. In addition to further reducing the
sample size (so much so that we can no longer estimate the model for some measures
of opportunistic behavior) and list of determinants, our focus is now also limited to a
potentially unrepresentative subset of cases in which the SEP enforcer chose to pursue
multiple parties at once. Moreover, patentees’ ability to join multiple defendants in
a single lawsuit was restricted by the America Invents Act which took effect in 2012.
Consequently, this sample consists disproportionately of cases filed in 2010 through
September 2012. All that said, and despite the fact that most coefficients have now
lost their statistical significance, we note that the results shown in Table A-12 do not
contradict and, in fact, generally agree with the results shown in Table 4.
Finally, in Tables A-13 and A-14 in the appendix, we report the results of a dif-in-dif
approach that estimates the effect of three events that may have impacted opportunis-
tic behavior. Our approach focuses on just two measures of opportunism: requests for
injunctive relief in district court pleadings and the initiation of parallel ITC investiga-
tions. We limit our analysis to these two measures because they are both objective in
nature (i.e., neither rely on allegations) and, more importantly, because both can be
tied to a particular date. By contrast, all other measures are typically alleged to have
taken place (or begun) at some indeterminate or unspecified time in the past.52 Study-
ing these measures also allows us to take advantage of the fact that, under U.S. law,
operating technology companies (i.e., PEs) are far more likely than NPEs to obtain both
injunctions (Seaman, 2016) and ITC exclusion orders53 and, thus, are likely relatively
more sensitive to events that impact the availability of these remedies. Accordingly, we
rely on the PE/NPE distinction to establish our treatment (PE) and comparison (NPE)
groups.
We estimate both groups’ reaction to three events that may have impacted incen-
tives to seek injunctive relief in U.S. SEP cases. In chronological order, we first examine
(in column (1)) the impact of a joint policy statement released by the U.S. DOJ and
USPTO in January 2013.54 This statement (while vague) suggested that SEP enforcers
should typically be denied injunctive relief because “[s]uch an order may harm com-
petition and consumers by degrading one of the tools SDOs employ to mitigate the
threat of such opportunistic actions by the holders of F/RAND-encumbered patents.”
ciated in Table 3
52Consider the allegations quoted above in Section 4.4. While all provide specific details about the
SEP enforcer’s alleged behavior, none provide a specific date on which that behavior took place.
53See U.S. International Trade Commission, Facts and Trends Regarding USITC Section 337 Investiga-
tions (June 10, 2014).
54In December 2019, the DoJ and USPTO withdrew the 2013 policy statement. Unfortunately, because




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thus, this statement can be expected to have reduced the frequency with which injunc-
tions were requested in U.S. SEP cases. Next, we analyze the effect of two important
decisions released by U.S. Courts of Appeal in columns (2) and (3). In April 2014 in
Apple v. Motorola, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that SEP-holder
Motorola was not entitled to an injunction because “Motorola’s FRAND commitments,
which have yielded many license agreements . . . strongly suggest that money damages
are adequate to fully compensate Motorola for any infringement.”55 Similarly, in July
2015 in Microsoft v. Motorola, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
a jury verdict finding that Motorola breached its FRAND commitments by seeking an
injunction against SEP infringement in the case.56 Both decisions were highly antici-
pated by the patent community and can also be expected to reduce injunction requests
in SEP cases.
As shown in Table A-13, our results show large and highly statistically significant
level-differences in the likelihood that NPEs and PEs request injunctive relief (between
26% and 32%), which supports the motivation underlying our definition of treatment
and comparison groups. Moreover, as expected, we see a negative interaction term for
the 2013 policy statement and both court decisions. However, only the negative effect
of Apple v. Motorola is statistically significant. Table A-14 presents results for parallel
ITC investigation. To the contrary, we see here a positive interaction term for two of the
three events, and a statistically significant increase following the Microsoft v. Motorola
decision. This suggests an increase in parallel ITC litigation by PE SEP owners relative
to NPE SEP owners following the Microsoft v. Motorola decision. Because ITC investi-
gations tend to serve as substitutes, rather than complements, for obtaining injunctive
relief in court (Chien and Lemley, 2012), the positive effects that we observe here are
consistent with the negative effects shown in Table A-13.
5.4 Opportunistic conduct and case outcomes
Finally, we conclude our analysis by considering the impact of opportunistic behaviors
on case outcomes. We focus primarily on the relationship between our measures and
settlement, both because settlement is by far the most common outcome that we ob-
serve and because the intended goal of most forms of opportunism that we study is
arguably to induce accused infringers to accept the SEP enforcer’s royalty demands.
5.4.1 Empirical results
Table 5 cross-tabulates our measures of opportunistic behavior with overall case out-
comes. In addition to presenting results for our entire sample of cases (in the five
leftmost columns), we also present results for the subset of cases that were litigated to
at least one responsive pleasing by the accused infringer (the middle five columns), as
well as results for the (even smaller) subset of cases that were litigated to a ruling on
at least one substantive motion (the five rightmost columns).
55757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
56795 F.3d. 1024, 1045-47 (9th Cir. 2015).
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First, comparing across these three sets of results, we see that cases resolved by a
substantive ruling or trial (column (1)) exhibit a higher rate of opportunistic behavior
than cases terminated on other grounds. To some extent this finding is driven by the fact
that, as cases progress toward a substantive ruling, more information becomes available
in the docket and, therefore, certain types of opportunistic behavior are more likely to
be revealed (see discussion in Section 5.2 above). However, even when we condition on
at least one substantive motion ruling (in the five rightmost columns), we see that cases
terminated on the merits still exhibit the highest rate of aggressive behavior. Because
settlement terms are almost always confidential, we cannot judge whether individual
settlements were favorable to the SEP enforcer or the accused infringer and, thus, we
cannot determine the extent to which settlements are driven by the strength of the
SEP enforcer’s infringement allegations. Nonetheless, our findings raise the possibility
that particularly aggressive behavior by SEP enforcers can induce accused infringers to
respond with particularly aggressive defenses, which ultimately decrease the likelihood
of settlement.
In Table 6, we report the share of decided NPE and PE cases that include each mea-
sure of opportunism. While it is prudent to interpret the statistics with caution due to
the relatively small number of cases that did not settle, we observe here that decided
cases reveal plenty of opportunistic behavior, especially by operating technology com-
panies and regardless of whether the case is ultimately decided for or against the SEP
enforcer. This suggests that, conditional on a case not settling, opportunistic behav-
iors have little effect on the SEP enforcer’s likelihood of winning the case, which again
suggests that the principal objective of these behaviors is to influence settlement terms
rather than the merits of the case.
We take a closer look at the connect between opportunistic behavior and settlement
in Table 7. Here, we compare settled and decided cases, and drop all cases that were
terminated on “other” grounds or remain ongoing. Table 7 presents the results from
a linear probability model where the outcome is equal to one if the case settled (mea-
sured at the patent-party-case level). We present results for both the summary measure
any opportunistic behavior (columns (1), (3), and (5)) and for the full set of remaining
measures (columns (2), (4), and (6)). We also run the analysis with three different
samples. First (in columns (1) and (2)), we restrict the sample to cases that were liti-
gated for at least one year (measured as the difference between filing and termination
date). Second (in columns (3) and (4)), we condition on the accused infringer filing at
least one answer to the SEP enforcer’s infringement allegations. And third (in columns
(5) and (6)), we condition on the defendant filing a second, amended answer to the
infringement allegations. We use these three samples to ensure that our results are
derived from cases in which the accused infringer mounted a meaningful defense, as
well as to mitigate the fact that information on opportunistic behavior is often revealed
as a case progresses.
Results for our summary measure are only statistically significant in the sample of
cases in which the accused infringer filed an amended answer (column (5)), and in
that sample, the measure is positively associated with settlement. Our results for the
full set of measures (columns (2), (4), and (6)) show that they are jointly significant in































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer by overall win/loss outcome (2010-
2019)
P win D win
PE NPE PE NPE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Any opportunistic behavior 100 100 100 66.32
2 Injunction 100 45.83 100 35.71
3 Untimely declaration 0 12.50 12.90 27.55
4 Overdeclaration 0 0 9.67 6.12
5 Exhaustion 12.50 4.16 70.96 21.42
6 Discriminatory license 0 0 9.67 6.12
7 Threats to sue customers 0 0 0 0
8 Parallel ITC litigation 0 8.33 0 1.02
9 Relevant litigation abroad 0 0 0 0
10 No disclosure 0 0 0 0
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 100 45.83 48.38 13.26
12 Prior licenses not comparable 87.50 70.83 48.38 9.18
13 Other 100 8.33 29.03 10.20
Total cases 16 24 31 98
Notes: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; 1) In the answer
(and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in
some kind of opportunistic behavior or something that might constitute a FRAND violation? 2) In the complaint (or counterclaim)
did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did
not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the technology was adopted? 4) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer
was trying to force the accused infringer to license (along with SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the
standard? 5) Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component
supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly
situated companies/licensees? 7) Did the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing dispute, either
by contacting them or threatening to sue them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the
accused infringer at the ITC in parallel to the district court litigation?; 9) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the
accused infringer in another country - e.g., in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the
US? 10) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior
licenses with similarly situated companies? 11) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying
to base the royalty owed on the price of the end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the
SSPPU). 12) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior
licenses that were not really comparable (due to differences in patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc). 13) Did
the accused infringer make some other specific allegation that something might be a FRAND violation?
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nation. Looking across all three samples, we see that while requesting an injunction in
pleadings does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on settlement, pursuit
of an importation ban in parallel ITC litigation and injunctive relief in relevant litigation
abroad both have a significant positive effect on settlement. This may indicate that ac-
cused infringers view the ITC and foreign patent litigation, but not U.S. district courts,
as posing a credible threat of an eventual disruption to sales.57 Untimely declaration,
discriminatory license, threats to sue customers, and no disclosure are all positively as-
sociated with settlement as well. At the same time, overdeclaration, exhaustion, EMVR
vs. SSPUU, and prior licenses not comparable are negatively associated with settlement.
These results may indicate that, while some behaviors are successful at inducing set-
tlement, others tend to impede settlement. We also note that all four variables with
a negative effect on settlement — overdeclaration, exhaustion, EMVR vs. SSPUU, and
prior licenses not comparable — are intended to have a direct effect on the royalty base
and rate used to calculate how much the accused infringer owes.
Here, as in Section 5.3, we can additionally rely on within technology and SEP en-
forcer variation to mitigate concerns over unobservables. These results, shown in Table
8, do differ somewhat from the results in Table 7. Namely, our summary measure is
no longer statistically significant in column (5) and, moreover, its coefficient is close to
zero. That said, our remaining measures remain jointly significant in columns (2), (4),
and (6). Among individual measures, the main difference we see is that alleged entitle-
ment to an injunction and threats to sue customers are now significantly, and negatively,
associated with settlement. However, discriminatory license, parallel ITC litigation, and
no disclosure all continue to have a statistically significant, positive association with
settlement, and EMVR vs. SSPPU continues to have a significant, negative association.
All other measures lose their statistical significance. Despite this and the differences
identified above, our results still suggest that opportunistic conduct affects settlement
and also that different types of opportunistic behavior can have opposing effects on
settlement.
5.4.2 Theoretical model
To gain more insight into the effect of opportunism on settlement and explain why dif-
ferent opportunistic behaviors can have different effects on settlement, we construct
a simple model of SEP litigation. In this model, an SEP enforcer making a settlement
demand to an accused infringer faces a tradeoff between a high settlement amount and
a high probability that the demand be accepted. Our main result is that opportunistic
behavior by the SEP enforcer may tilt this tradeoff in one direction or the other. Specif-
ically, and consistently with our empirical results, we find that behaviors that primarily
increase the accused infringer’s litigation costs tend to increase the settlement rate,
while behaviors that primarily increase the accused infringer’s loss in case settlement
fails and the SEP enforcer prevails in court tend to decrease the settlement rate. We first
describe our setting and compute the relevant equilibrium variables and then analyze
the impact of opportunistic conduct on the settlement rate.
57Indeed, we observed only a single case in which an SEP enforcer even filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction and zero cases in which a permanent injunction was awarded after trial.
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Table 7: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer (at the patent-party-level) and case
outcomes (2010-2019)
Settlement (0/1)
Litigation ≥ 1 year ≥ 1 answer by D ≥ 2 answer by D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior -0.0598 -0.0315 0.228***
(0.0434) (0.0310) (0.0767)
2 Injunction -0.0390 -0.00125 0.0941
(0.0544) (0.0386) (0.0630)
3 Untimely declaration 0.0563* 0.0488* 0.179***
(0.0341) (0.0254) (0.0453)
4 Overdeclaration -0.319*** -0.152** -0.0830
(0.123) (0.0695) (0.0852)
5 Exhaustion -0.00745 -0.0464* -0.117**
(0.0357) (0.0265) (0.0463)
6 Discriminatory license 0.0129 -0.0468 0.395***
(0.0909) (0.0607) (0.0597)
7 Threats to sue customers -0.0733 0.158** 0.0179
(0.160) (0.0706) (0.0984)
8 Parallel ITC litigation 0.325*** 0.163*** 0.190**
(0.0815) (0.0512) (0.0952)
9 Relevant litigation abroad 0.224* 0.267*** 0.144
(0.120) (0.0990) (0.119)
10 No disclosure 0.296** 0.0634 -0.0947
(0.132) (0.0741) (0.123)
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 0.143 0.0538 -0.261**
(0.110) (0.0701) (0.115)
12 Prior licenses not comparable -0.490*** -0.491*** -0.114
(0.0926) (0.0832) (0.109)
13 Other 0.0245 0.0256 -0.0131
(0.0654) (0.0485) (0.0684)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Case filing year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 11.90 9.25 9.68
R2 0.308 0.408 0.292 0.384 0.263 0.378
Observations 1,027 1,027 1,345 1,345 583 583
Notes: Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; OLS coefficients shown; robust standard errors clustered at the patent-
level; * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%; 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer (specifically)
allege that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something that might
constitute a FRAND violation? 2) In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3) Did the
accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the technology
was adopted? 4) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer to license
(along with SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused infringer (specifically)
allege that the patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer make a
specific allegation that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees? 7) Did the
patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to sue
them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g.,
in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 9) Did the accused infringer make a
specific allegation that the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies?
10) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the
end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 11) Did the accused infringer argue
that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due
to differences in patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc). 12) Did the accused infringer make some other specific
allegation that something might be a FRAND violation?
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Table 8: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer (at the patent-party-level) and case
outcomes: comparison for same SEP enforcer across cases (2010-2019)
Settlement (0/1)
Litigation ≥ 1 year ≥ 1 answer by D ≥ 2 answer by D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior -0.0770 -0.0539 -0.00141
(0.0590) (0.0456) (0.175)
2 Injunction -0.305** -0.0952 -0.0783
(0.147) (0.0851) (0.198)
3 Untimely declaration 0.0132 0.0307 -0.0496
(0.0687) (0.0655) (0.140)
4 Overdeclaration -0.118 -0.0858 0.366
(0.177) (0.124) (0.238)
5 Exhaustion -0.00525 -0.0401 -0.131
(0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0812)
6 Discriminatory license 0.534** 0.217 0.714***
(0.207) (0.140) (0.201)
7 Threats to sue customers -0.503 -0.130 -0.340*
(0.352) (0.143) (0.180)
8 Parallel ITC litigation 0.387*** 0.271*** 0.0986
(0.104) (0.0959) (0.147)
9 Relevant litigation abroad -0.0516 0.144 -0.315
(0.189) (0.189) (0.278)
10 No disclosure 0.408 0.193* -0.0361
(0.275) (0.117) (0.245)
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU -0.252 -0.192 -0.459*
(0.267) (0.218) (0.259)
12 Prior licenses not comparable -0.0266 -0.171 0.0619
(0.219) (0.192) (0.243)
13 Other 0.000656 0.0301 0.136
(0.133) (0.0930) (0.122)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Case filing year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SEP enforcer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Technology FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 5.29 4.24 3.75
R2 0.404 0.486 0.346 0.405 0.372 0.504
Observations 491 491 668 668 248 248
Notes: Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; OLS coefficients shown; robust standard errors clustered at the case-level;
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%; 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer (specifically) allege
that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something that might constitute
a FRAND violation? 2) In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3) Did the accused
infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the technology was
adopted? 4) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer to license (along with
SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the
patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation
that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees? 7) Did the patent enforcer bring
the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to sue them or actually suing
them? 8) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g., in an attempt to get an
injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 9) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that
the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies? 10) Did the accused
infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the end product (using the
EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 11) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer
was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due to differences in patents,
duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc). 12) Did the accused infringer make some other specific allegation that something
might be a FRAND violation?
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Setting. Consider an SEP enforcer (plaintiff) P and an accused infringer (defendant)
D. Denote cP and cD the litigation costs of the SEP enforcer and the accused infringer,
respectively, θ the probability that the court finds that the patent is infringed, and α the
probability that the patent’s validity is upheld by the court. If the court finds that the
patent is invalid, the SEP enforcer incurs a loss lP .
58 If the court finds that the patent
is valid and infringed, the accused infringer incurs a loss lD. For the sake of simplicity,
let us assume that the SEP enforcer’s gain if the patent is found valid and infringed is
also equal to lD. This is for instance the case if lD is the amount of damages paid by
the accused infringer to the SEP enforcer. If the court finds that the patent is valid but
not infringed, we assume that neither the accused infringer nor the SEP enforcer are
affected by this decision. The probability of infringement θ ∈ (θ ,θ] is known to the
accused infringer while the SEP enforcer only knows that it is drawn from a uniform
distribution over an interval [θ ,θ].
Consider the following game:
Stage 1: P makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand to D.
Stage 2: D decides whether to accept the demand. If it is accepted, the game
ends; otherwise P and D incur litigation costs cP and cD, and court decisions
regarding infringement, and validity are handed down.59
Note that we implicitly assume that the SEP enforcer’s litigation threat is always credi-
ble,60 which is standard in the economic literature on settlement.61
Accused infringer’s decision. The accused infringer accepts to pay a settlement amount
S if and only if
S ≤ αθ lD + cD
or, equivalently, if and only if




As expected, the higher the settlement amount, the lower the probability that the set-
tlement demand is accepted by the accused infringer.
SEP enforcer’s decision. The SEP enforcer knows that a demand S will be accepted by
the accused infringer with probability θ−θ̃ (S)
θ−θ
and turned down with probability θ̃ (S)−θ
θ−θ
.
In the latter scenario, the SEP enforcer’s probability of winning (i.e., the probability that
58For instance, the SEP enforcer may incur losses because the current licensees may stop paying license
fees.
59We assume that the accused infringer challenges the patent’s validity, which is typically the case in
practice.
60This holds if θ ≥ cP+(1−α)lDαlD .
61For a survey see for example Spier (2007). A notable exception is Nalebuff (1987).
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the patent is found valid and infringed) is α θ̃ (S)+θ2 . Thus, the SEP enforcer’s expected
payoff is given by
G(S) =












The first-order condition with respect to S gives the equilibrium settlement amount:
S∗ = αlDθ − cP − (1−α) lP , (1)
assuming that the parameters are such that this amount is positive. We find that S∗
increases with lD and α and decreases with cP and lP , which is consistent with the in-
tuition that the settlement amount should increase if the SEP enforcer’s (resp., accused
infringer’s) payoff absent settlement increases (resp., decreases).
Settlement rate. Denoting θ ∗ = θ̃ (S∗), we have
θ ∗ = θ −
cP + cD + (1−α) lP
αlD
, (2)




. We can now compute the
equilibrium settlement rate, i.e., the probability that the equilibrium settlement demand
is accepted:
r∗ =












where∆≡ cP+ cD+(1−α) lP is the joint surplus generated by settlement, and A≡ αlD
is a measure of the extent of adverse selection: It becomes more costly for the SEP
enforcer to separate defendant types when A increases.62 The equilibrium settlement
rate is higher when the joint surplus from settlement is higher and is lower when the
adverse selection problem faced by the SEP enforcer is more severe.
Impact of opportunistic conduct on the settlement rate. An SEP enforcer can rely
on a variety of opportunistic conduct to place pressure on an accused infringer in order
to increase the expected monetary transfer from the latter to the former. In our simple
framework, such a conduct would lead to an increase in the accused infringer’s litigation
costs cD and/or an increase in her loss lD in case settlement fails and the SEP enforcer
prevails in court (i.e. the patent is found valid and infringed). Therefore, it could yield
an increase in the joint surplus from settlement ∆ and/or an increase in the extent of
adverse selection A. Since ∆ and A have opposite effects on the settlement rate, the
net impact of a given opportunistic behavior is ambiguous in general. Specifically, it
depends on the effect of the behavior on the ratio ∆/A.
In particular, our model shows that opportunistic behaviors that primarily affect the
accused infringer’s litigation costs tend to have a positive effect on the settlement rate.
62To see why, notice that the informational rent that an SEP enforcer leaves to defendants that have a
type above the borderline type θ̃ (S) is αθ lD + cD − S = θA+ cD − S, which is increasing in A.
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This may explain why behaviors such as threats to sue customers, parallel ITC litigation,
and relevant litigation abroad are positively associated with settlement. In contrast, op-
portunistic behaviors that primarily affect the accused infringer’s loss if settlement fails
and the SEP enforcer prevails in court tend to have a negative effect on the settlement
rate. This is in-line with our empirical finding that behaviors that directly affect the roy-
alty base and rate are negatively associated with settlement, notably overdeclaration,
exhaustion, EMVR vs. SSPUU, and prior licenses not comparable.
6 Conclusion
We contribute to the literature on SEP licensing by quantifying the prevalence of op-
portunistic behaviors (or allegations thereof) revealed in the dockets of all U.S. district
court cases filed 2010-2019 to enforce declared SEPs. Despite well recognized deficien-
cies in the empirical literature surrounding SEP holdup, scholars have to date failed to
take full advantage of information available in public filings. We aim to fill this gap in
our understanding of SEP licensing.
Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the SEP enforcer in approxi-
mately 75% of patent-party level SEP assertions. In addition, across almost all measures
of opportunism that we explore, we find that such behavior is revealed more often in
cases brought by operating technology companies than cases brought by NPEs.
While it is true that many of our measures of opportunistic behavior are based on
allegations by accused infringers, we strictly limit our data to allegations of strategic
behavior that are supported by specific factual statements. Moreover, by combining our
measures with detailed information on litigants and case outcomes, we make a number
of additional findings that support the general veracity of accused infringers’ pleadings.
In addition, while we do not claim that the presence of any behavior that we observe
constitutes per se empirical proof of holdup, our examination of factors that correlate
with the different opportunistic behaviors links our analysis to the theoretical literature
on patent holdup, and we note that opportunistic behaviors are likely to be particularly
effective in the SEP licensing context due to a general lack of adequate substitutes to
standardized technology.
Finally, we explore whether our measures of strategic behavior affect case outcomes.
Interestingly, our empirical findings show that opportunistic behaviors have mixed ef-
fects on settlement. We provide a theoretical explanation for these results based on
the distinction between behaviors that mainly aim at increasing the accused infringer’s
litigation costs and those that primarily increase the accused infringer’s loss in case set-
tlement fails and the SEP owner prevails in court. While we cannot make claims about
the welfare effects of opportunistic behaviors by SEP holders based on our analysis, we
believe that the distinction above may also matter for those effects.
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Online Appendix
A Appendix: Technology and Product Classifications
Each patent-party-level infringement claim in our data is classified according to:
(i) The type of standardized technology or technologies that are allegedly covered
by the patent enforcer’s rights;
(ii) The specific product(s) or service(s) in which the accused infringer has allegedly
incorporated those technologies.
In this Appendix, we explain our classification methodology in greater detail.
Technology Classifications
To classify the standardized technology at issue in each case, we adopted the two-level
taxonomy shown below. By far, the two most common classifications in our data are
“compression/encoding” and “wireless communication.” The “compression/encoding”
category includes standardized technologies for coding (and decoding) data, generally
in a compressed form, for storage or transmission over a network. At the second level
of categorization, we distinguish among standards for encoding/compressing images
(e.g., JPEG), videos (e.g., MPEG-4), voice (e.g, Enhanced Voice Services), other audio
(e.g., MP3), text messages (e.g., Multimedia Messaging Service), and data for storage
on discs (e.g., Blu-ray). “Wireless communication” comprises standards for the trans-
mission of data on a wireless network. Given the composition of cases in our data,
we further distinguish among standards for transmission over a cellular network (e.g.,
CDMA, GSM, and LTE), over a Wi-Fi network (i.e., the IEEE 802.11 family of standards),
or using another technology such a Bluetooth.
A majority of the remaining categories also relate directly to data transmission over
a network. Our “media broadcast” category covers standards for the broadcast of audio
and/or video data, including both digital television (e.g., ATSC standards) and digital
radio (e.g., satellite radio) transmission. Next, our “wired communication” category
includes standards for data transmission over physical connections like wires or cables.
In our data this category is limited to cases involving digital subscriber line (DSL) tech-
nology and fiber optics. Finally, our “virtual private network” category, which covers
technology for extending a private network across a public network, is composed solely
of cases filed by VirnetX
Our remaining two categories have a much more indirect link to networking. We
define “near field communication” standards as those governing the exchange of data
over very short distances when a “tag” is exposed to an electromagnetic field. In our
data, all such cases involve radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology. Similarly,
our “mobile code” classification is composed entirely of cases involving a single tech-
nology: Quick Response (QR) codes.
i
Finally, we note that individual patents are commonly declared essential to multiple
standards, and sometimes those standards span our classifications. For all “multiply-
declared” patents, we consulted the pleadings filed in each case, and the allegations
pled against each accused infringer, and classified each patent-party-level assertion ac-
cording to the specific technology identified in the case. Only very rarely did an indi-













• Near field communication
• Virtual private network
• Wired communication:







Product and Service Classifications
For each patent-party-level assertion we classified the specific product(s) or service(s)
in which each standardized technology was allegedly incorporated. We categorized
products and services using the taxonomy shown below.
Though the categories are largely self-explanatory, we provide a few additional
notes here. First, the category “mobile device” includes smartphones and tablet com-
puters, as well as (in a small number of cases) smartwatches and MP3 players (such
as the Apple iPod). By contrast, our definition of “computer” is limited to laptop and
desktop computers, our definition of “telephone” is limited to desktop phones with a
wired (landline or VoIP connection) connection, and our definition of “camera” is lim-
ited to standalone still and/or video cameras. Our definition of “network hardware”
includes (standalone) modems, routers, and gateways (most commonly), as well as
base stations, access points, nodes, and session border controllers. In addition to chips,
chipsets, and wireless modules, our definition of “component chip/module/card” in-
cludes a few additional items, including server blades and modem “sticks,” that were
designed to be incorporated into a larger end product. Our “Internet of things” cate-
gory includes both one case involving automotive technology and two cases involving
“smart home” products. Finally, a single accused infringer was commonly alleged to
sell more than one product or service, in which case we include the relevant patent-
party-level infringement allegations in both categories with two exceptions: (i) when
infringement was alleged in both a computing device and software that can only run
on that computer device (such as Apple devices and Apple software), we classified the
case according to the computer device and did not additionally classify it as a “software
product” case, and (ii) when a wireless service provider that sells mobile devices was
sued alongside mobile device manufacturers, we did classified allegations against the
wireless service provider in the “network/internet/wireless service provider” category,
and not additionally in the “mobile device” category.
The resulting product categories are:
• Mobile device





• Media service provider













In this Appendix we provide an overview of the variables used in the regression analysis:
• P is NPE: = 1 if the plaintiff is an NPE.
• P is both P and D: = 1 if the plaintiff appears as both plaintiff and defendant in
our dataset of SEP court cases between 2010 and 2019.
• D is both P and D: = 1 if the defendant appears as both plaintiff and defendant
in our dataset of SEP court cases between 2010 and 2019.
• P upstream of D: = 1 if the plaintiff is upstream of the defendant.
• P and D competitors: = 1 if the plaintiff and defendant are product market
competitors.
• D prior licensee of P: = 1 if the plaintiff and defendant had a prior licensing
agreement.
• D technology user: = 1 if the defendant use the infringing technology to sell
something (significantly) unrelated, = 0 if the defendant sell the infringing tech-
nology.
• Technology in component: = 1 if the infringement substantially occurs in a
component of the accused product, or the infringement occurs in some prod-
uct/service that the defendant buys from an upstream vendor; = 0 if the accused
product is, itself, a component.
• Log P’s SEP portfolio size: log of plaintiff’s SEP portfolio size. The portfolio size
takes into account all declared SEPs assigned to the plaintiff at the time of the
filing date of the court case, i.e. the portfolio size measure varies over time as
SEP owners buy and sell SEPs.
• Declaratory action: = 1 if the case is a declaratory action as opposed to an
infringement action.
• D answer count: count of answers filed by the defendant.
• MTD: = 1 if a motion to dismiss was filed.
• MSJ: = 1 if a motion for summary judgment was filed.
• Case consolidated: = 1 is several separate court cases were consolidated by the
court into a single case.
• SEP in pool: = 1 is SEP is part of a patent pool.
• Patent reassigned: = 1 if the patent has been re-assigned at least once at any
point between independent entities.
v
C Appendix: Figures
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Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The graph shows the number of cases (at the patent-party-level) that
involve SEPs between 2010 and 2019.
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Figure A-2: Average number of court cases (at the patent-party-level) per SEP by SSO
















































































































Note: PE: practicing entity; NPE: non-practicing entity. The graph shows the number of cases that involve SEPs per SSO to which
the patents were declared standard-essential and NPE status of the enforcing entity between 2010 and 2019.
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Prior licenses not comparable
Notes: Share: share of all cases (at the patent-party-case level) that allege opportunistic conduct; Any opportunistic behavior: In
the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor)
engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something that might constitute a FRAND violation? Injunction: In the
complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? Untimely declaration: Did the accused infringer
argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the technology was adopted?
Overdeclaration: Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer to license
(along with SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the standard? Exhaustion: Did the accused infringer
(specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component supplier)? Discriminatory license:
Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly situated
companies/licensees? Threats to sue customers: Did the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing
dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to sue them or actually suing them? Parallel ITC litigation: Did the patent
enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the ITC in parallel to the district court litigation?; Relevant litigation
abroad: Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g., in an attempt to get an
injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? No disclosure: Did the accused infringer make a specific
allegation that the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies? EMVR
vs. SSPUU: Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price
of the end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). Prior licenses not comparable:
Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were
not really comparable (due to differences in patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc).
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Figure A-4: Case outcomes of SEPs and by allegedly infringing technology (2010-2019)
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Share of court cases
Note: The graph shows outcomes at the patent-party-case level for cases that involve SEPs by allegedly infringing technology
between 2010 and 2019.
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Figure A-5: Overall win/loss case outcomes (at the patent-party-level) of SEPs by al-
legedly infringing technology (2010-2019)
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0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
compression/encoding other virtual private network
wired communication wireless communication
Number of court cases
Patent enforcer won Accused infringer won
Note: The graph shows overall win/loss outcomes at the patent-party-case level for cases that involve SEPs by allegedly infringing
technology between 2010 and 2019.
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D Appendix: Tables
Table A-1: Top-20 SEP asserting entities by NPE status (2010-2019)
Rank Name NPE # Cases Share
1 Acacia 1 286 15.80
2 Fineur International 1 179 9.89
3 Sol IP 1 135 7.46
4 Ericsson 0 75 4.14
5 SPH America 1 69 3.81
6 WiLan Quarterhill 1 68 3.75
7 Princeton Digital 1 66 3.64
8 Interdigital 1 60 3.31
8 LG Electronics 1 60 3.31
9 Multimedia Patent Trust 0 54 2.98
10 FastVDO 1 50 2.76
11 Huawei 0 46 2.54
12 Intellectual Ventures 1 45 2.48
13 Evolved Wireless 1 43 2.37
14 Samsung 0 41 2.26
15 Virnetx 1 39 2.15
16 Neomedia 1 37 2.04
16 Helferich Patent Licensing 1 37 2.04
17 Brevet Capital 1 32 1.76
18 Philips 0 29 1.60
19 Nokia 0 28 1.54
20 EVS Codec 1 25 1.38




Notes: NPE: non-practicing entity. The table shows the number of court cases (at the patent-party-case level) and
the corresponding share of total assertions between 2010-2019 by asserting party and NPE status.
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Table A-2: Top-20 defendants (2010-2019)
Rank Name # Cases % Share
1 Apple 127 7.02
2 AT&T 80 4.42
2 ZTE 80 4.42
3 Ericsson 78 4.43
4 Samsung 77 4.25
5 Haier 70 3.86
6 Verizon 69 3.81
6 Nokia 69 3.81
7 Sprint 68 3.75
8 T-Mobile 67 3.70
9 LG Electronics 57 3.15
10 Huawei 56 3.09
11 HTC 38 2.10
12 Lenovo 36 1.99
13 Microsoft 29 1.60
14 Motorola 28 1.54
14 Blackberry 28 1.54
15 Dell 27 1.49
16 Sony 26 1.43
17 Blu Products 24 1.32
18 Amazon 21 1.16
19 Toshiba 16 0.88
20 Netgear 15 0.83
20 Belkin 15 0.83
20 Honeywell 15 0.83
Total 1,216 67.21
Notes: The table shows the number of court cases (at the patent-party-case level) and the corresponding share of
total assertions between 2010-2019 by defending party.
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Table A-3: Court cases by SSO and NPE status (2010-2019)
SSO/Pool Company NPE # Cases Share
ARIB 2 1 3 0.12
ATIS 12 4 16 0.67
ATSC 108 0 108 4.55
AVC 24 19 43 1.81
BluRay 19 0 19 0.80
DVD 16 0 16 0.67
ETSI 261 928 1,189 50.18
IEC 5 1 6 0.25
IEEE 3 128 131 5.52
IETF 1 1 2 0.08
ISO 17 122 139 5.86
ITUT 134 228 362 15.28
MPEG DASH 5 0 5 0.21
MPEG Visual 14 66 80 3.37
OMA 1 37 38 1.60
SIPRO 9 175 184 7.76
VC1 10 18 28 1.18
Total 641 1,728 2,369 100.00
Notes: NPE: non-practicing entity. The table shows the number of court cases (at the patent-party-case level) and
the corresponding share of total assertions between 2010-2019 by SSO.
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Table A-4: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer for all court cases involving SEPs
(2010-2019)
All D Response MSJ/MTD
Opportunistic behavior # Cases % # Cases % # Cases %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior 1,370 75.73 1,260 81.34 272 91.27
2 Injunction 799 44.16 689 44.48 137 45.97
3 Untimely declaration 354 19.56 354 22.85 119 39.93
4 Overdeclaration 169 9.34 169 10.91 24 8.05
5 Exhaustion 392 21.66 392 25.30 88 29.53
6 Discriminatory license 155 8.56 155 10.00 13 4.36
7 Threats to sue customers 26 1.43 26 1.67 1 0.33
8 Parallel ITC litigation 94 5.19 77 4.97 19 6.37
9 Relevant litigation abroad 27 1.49 27 1.74 9 3.02
10 No disclosure 17 0.93 17 1.09 0 0
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 265 14.64 265 17.10 69 23.15
12 Prior licenses not comparable 149 8.23 149 9.61 67 22.48
13 Other 362 20.01 362 23.36 75 25.16
Notes: D response: only cases where the defendant filed at least one response to the complaint; MSJ/MTD: only cases where at
least one motion, a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment was filed; unit of observation at the patent-party-
case level; 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent enforcer
(or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something that might constitute a FRAND violation? 2)
In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3) Did the accused infringer argue that the
patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the technology was adopted? 4) Did the accused
infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer to license (along with SEPs) additional patents that
were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed
(often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer
was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees? 7) Did the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s
customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to sue them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent
enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the ITC in parallel to the district court litigation?; 9) Did the patent
enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g., in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany
when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 10) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer
simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies? 11) Did the accused infringer argue that
the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the end product (using the EMVR), rather than
the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 12) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying
to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due to differences in patents, duration, geographic






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A-6: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer by accused infringer type and NPE
status (2010-2019)
Accused infringer type Use/Sell Product/Component D prior licensee
Use Sell Product Component Yes No
Opportunistic behavior (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior 49.70 78.44 79.28 75.17 95.39 72.73
2 Injunction 41.91 44.56 62.72 42.79 45.60 43.94
3 Untimely declaration 9.58 20.52 5.32 20.49 2.92 22.10
4 Overdeclaration 0 10.26 1.77 9.71 43.93 4.07
5 Exhaustion 32.93 20.46 11.83 21.95 46.44 17.89
6 Discriminatory license 0 9.41 1.77 8.89 30.12 5.28
7 Threats to sue customers 0 1.57 3.55 1.17 3.76 1.08
8 Parallel ITC litigation 0 5.70 14.20 5.50 14.22 3.82
9 Relevant litigation abroad 0 1.63 2.36 1.34 3.34 1.21
10 No disclosure 0 1.03 0 0.99 0 1.08
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 0 16.08 14.20 14.28 15.48 14.52
12 Prior licenses not comparable 0 9.04 7.10 8.19 0.83 9.36
13 Other 0 21.97 11.24 20.37 70.71 12.29
Total cases 167 1,647 169 1,708 239 1,570
Notes: Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; Use/sell: Does the accused infringer sell the technology, or use it to sell
something (significantly) unrelated? Product/Component: Component is = 1 if the alleged infringement substantially occurs (i)
in a component of the accused product, or (ii) the infringement occurs in some product/service that the accused infringer buys
from an upstream vendor. Product = 1 if the accused product is, itself, a component; D prior licensee: = 1 is there was a prior
license between P and D. 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent
enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something that might constitute a FRAND violation?
2) In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3) Did the accused infringer argue that the
patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the technology was adopted? 4) Did the accused
infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer to license (along with SEPs) additional patents that
were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed
(often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer
was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees? 7) Did the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s
customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to sue them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent
enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the ITC in parallel to the district court litigation?; 9) Did the patent
enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g., in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany
when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 10) Did the accused infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer
simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies? 11) Did the accused infringer argue that
the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the end product (using the EMVR), rather than
the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 12) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying
to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due to differences in patents, duration, geographic
scope, licensee type, etc). 13) Did the accused infringer make some other specific allegation that something might be a FRAND
violation?
xvi
Table A-7: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer by product market relationship be-
tween SEP enforcer and accused infringer (2010-2019)
Licensor
P-D relation Competitor Diff. market NPE Upstream Downstream Gov/univ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior 75.98 77.77 72.52 92.30 100 92.85
2 Injunction 41.57 72.22 39.11 74.87 81.81 35.71
3 Untimely declaration 7.52 55.55 22.40 17.94 0 7.14
4 Overdeclaration 29.74 5.55 2.88 21.02 0 50.00
5 Exhaustion 20.78 0 17.01 49.23 81.81 14.28
6 Discriminatory license 30.46 5.55 4.21 4.10 0 50.00
7 Threats to sue customers 2.86 5.55 0.93 1.53 0 14.28
8 Parallel ITC litigation 4.30 22.22 4.37 9.23 18.18 0
9 Relevant litigation abroad 4.65 0 0.85 1.02 0 7.14
10 No disclosure 3.22 0 0.62 0 0 0
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 14.69 0 11.55 37.43 0 21.42
12 Prior licenses not comparable 10.75 0 6.08 21.02 0 0
13 Other 45.16 81.81 9.36 44.61 81.81 71.42
Total cases 279 22 1,281 195 22 14
Notes: Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings) did the accused infringer
(specifically) allege that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic behavior or something
that might constitute a FRAND violation? 2) In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction? 3)
Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to the SSO until after the
technology was adopted? 4) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the accused infringer
to license (along with SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused infringer
(specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused infringer
make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees? 7) Did
the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening to
sue them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the ITC in parallel
to the district court litigation?; 9) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g.,
in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 10) Did the accused infringer make a
specific allegation that the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies?
11) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the
end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 12) Did the accused infringer argue
that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due
to differences in patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc). 13) Did the accused infringer make some other specific
allegation that something might be a FRAND violation?
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Table A-8: Opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer by licensor/licensee relation (2010-
2019)
P is both only P P is NPE
D both only D D both only D D both only D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Any opportunistic behavior 82.35 80.88 93.48 86.11 75.85 71.11
2 Injunction 68.24 41.67 52.17 67.59 47.51 35.56
3 Untimely declaration 7.06 14.71 0 23.15 20.47 23.22
4 Overdeclaration 12.94 35.29 39.13 18.52 1.31 3.56
5 Exhaustion 47.65 17.16 54.35 30.56 14.17 18.22
6 Discriminatory license 5.88 34.80 0 18.52 3.94 4.33
7 Threats to sue customers 0 3.92 2.17 4.63 2.62 0.22
8 Parallel ITC litigation 18.24 1.96 6.52 0 10.50 1.78
9 Relevant litigation abroad 7.65 0.98 2.17 0 1.57 0.56
10 No disclosure 5.29 0 0 0 0.79 0.56
11 EMVR vs. SSPUU 22.94 24.51 47.83 5.56 12.07 11.33
12 Prior licenses not comparable 8.24 24.02 8.70 3.70 12.34 3.44
13 Other 48.82 55.39 39.13 25.93 13.91 7.44
Total cases 170 204 46 108 381 900
Notes: NPE: non-practicing entity. Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; 1) In the answer (and/or other, later filings)
did the accused infringer (specifically) allege that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) engaged in some kind of opportunistic
behavior or something that might constitute a FRAND violation? 2) In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer
request an injunction? 3) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer (or its predecessor) did not disclose the SEP to
the SSO until after the technology was adopted? 4) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was trying to force the
accused infringer to license (along with SEPs) additional patents that were not actually essential to the standard? 5) Did the accused
infringer (specifically) allege that the patent was already licensed (often by an upstream component supplier)? 6) Did the accused
infringer make a specific allegation that the patent enforcer was treating it differently then similarly situated companies/licensees?
7) Did the patent enforcer bring the accused infringer’s customers in the licensing dispute, either by contacting them or threatening
to sue them or actually suing them? 8) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the ITC in parallel
to the district court litigation?; 9) Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer in another country - e.g.,
in an attempt to get an injunction in Germany when it couldn’t get an injunction in the US? 10) Did the accused infringer make a
specific allegation that the patent enforcer simply refused to disclose the terms of prior licenses with similarly situated companies?
11) Did the accused infringer argue that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on the price of the
end product (using the EMVR), rather than the price of a component/module (the SSPPU). 12) Did the accused infringer argue
that the patent enforcer was improperly trying to base the royalty owed on prior licenses that were not really comparable (due
to differences in patents, duration, geographic scope, licensee type, etc). 13) Did the accused infringer make some other specific



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A-13: Effect of events on opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer: injunctive relief
(2010-2019)
Injunction†
DoJ 2013 Apple v. Microsoft v.
policy statement Motorola Motorola
8 Jan 2013 25 Apr 2014 30 Jul 2015
(1) (2) (3)
P/D characteristics
Event -0.593*** 0.164* -0.0773
(0.103) (0.0964) (0.125)
P is NPE -0.321*** -0.259*** -0.277***
(0.0912) (0.0784) (0.0785)
Event × NPE -0.0127 -0.130* -0.105
(0.0797) (0.0776) (0.0792)
P/D characteristics
P is both P and D 0.00938 -0.0272 -0.0202
(0.0602) (0.0590) (0.0594)
D is both P and D 0.0288 0.0304 0.0280
(0.0224) (0.0222) (0.0222)
P upstream of D -0.184** -0.169** -0.160**
(0.0725) (0.0679) (0.0691)
P and D competitors -0.286*** -0.283*** -0.274***
(0.0741) (0.0722) (0.0721)
D prior licensee of P 0.261*** 0.291*** 0.294***
(0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0435)
D technology user -0.0042 -0.0119 -0.0064
(0.0603) (0.0624) (0.0637)
Technology in component -0.0977** -0.101** -0.102**
(0.0449) (0.0432) (0.0434)
Log P’s SEP portfolio size -0.0081 0.0022 0.0007
(0.0165) (0.0160) (0.0161)
Case characteristics
Declaratory action -0.372*** -0.423*** -0.424***
(0.0628) (0.0625) (0.0648)
D answer count 0.0213 0.0271** 0.0275**
(0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0138)
MTD 0.196 0.204 0.203
(0.142) (0.143) (0.137)
MSJ 0.0533 0.0645 0.0608
(0.0459) (0.0475) (0.0486)
Case consolidated -0.0846 -0.103** -0.0999**
(0.0525) (0.0520) (0.0506)
Patent characteristics
SEP in pool -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.190***
(0.0384) (0.0396) (0.0388)
Patent reassigned -0.0764* -0.0732* -0.0742*
(0.0396) (0.0403) (0.0407)
Case filing year Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.590 0.582 0.582
Observations 1,781 1,781 1,781
Notes: Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; OLS coefficients shown; robust standard errors clustered at the case-level;
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%; † In the complaint (or counterclaim) did the patent enforcer request an injunction?
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Table A-14: Effect of events on opportunistic behavior by SEP enforcer: Parallel ITC
investigation (2010-2019)
Parallel ITC litigation†
DoJ 2013 Apple v. Microsoft v.
policy statement Motorola Motorola
8 Jan 2013 25 Apr 2014 30 Jul 2015
(1) (2) (3)
P/D characteristics
Event -0.671*** 0.0163 0.0406
(0.0906) (0.0388) (0.0522)
P is NPE -0.00217 0.0433 0.0157
(0.0560) (0.0527) (0.0497)
Event × NPE 0.00433 -0.0322 0.0732*
(0.0416) (0.0388) (0.0387)
P/D characteristics
P is both P and D 0.0380 0.00693 0.0148
(0.0370) (0.0387) (0.0387)
D is both P and D 0.0436*** 0.0452*** 0.0462***
(0.00963) (0.00985) (0.00996)
P upstream of D -0.0411 -0.0207 -0.0307
(0.0522) (0.0539) (0.0541)
P and D competitors -0.145*** -0.127** -0.121**
(0.0493) (0.0520) (0.0537)
D prior licensee of P 0.0922*** 0.127*** 0.127***
(0.0307) (0.0331) (0.0332)
D technology user 0.0528** 0.0587*** 0.0681***
(0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0227)
Technology in component 0.0573*** 0.0589*** 0.0671***
(0.0182) (0.0191) (0.0198)
Log P’s SEP portfolio size 0.0354*** 0.0465*** 0.0462***
(0.00992) (0.0108) (0.0107)
Case characteristics
Declaratory action -0.0888*** -0.115*** -0.0784***
(0.0275) (0.0302) (0.0281)
D answer count -0.0251*** -0.0203** -0.0223***
(0.00742) (0.00806) (0.00802)
MTD -0.0232* -0.0200 -0.0260
(0.0134) (0.0148) (0.0168)
MSJ 0.0710* 0.0866** 0.0916**
(0.0396) (0.0407) (0.0404)
Case consolidated -0.00886 -0.0285 -0.0316*
(0.0167) (0.0181) (0.0181)
Patent characteristics
SEP in pool -0.00182 -0.00529 -0.00865
(0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0164)
Patent reassigned -0.0847*** -0.0894*** -0.102***
(0.0233) (0.0251) (0.0254)
Case filing year Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.375 0.315 0.319
Observations 1,781 1,781 1,781
Notes: Unit of observation at the patent-party-case level; OLS coefficients shown; robust standard errors clustered at the case-
level; * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%; † Did the patent enforcer initiate litigation against the accused infringer at the
ITC in parallel to the district court litigation?
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